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to show that FmHA was entitled to the 
writ? 
[5] Bretz argues that the following de-
fects were present in the motion for an 
order of writ of assistance: the affidavit in 
support of the FmHA motion showed the 
wrong dates for the sheriffs sale and the 
certificate of sale; no judgment was prop-
erly obtained; there was no proper notice 
of redemption, no proper publication of no-
tice of sale, and no actual notice of sale; 
the redemption time was exceeded accord-
ing to the dates given on the notice; and 
the sheriffs deed was issued too early. 
Many of the defects claimed under this 
issue are discussed under the other issues 
in this appeal. It is true that the dates 
given in the affidavit as the dates of the 
sheriffs sale and the certificate of sale 
were incorrect We admonish respondent's 
counsel, who executed the affidavit in sup-
port of the motion for the writ, to exercise 
caution in insuring the accuracy of his fil-
ings. 
For a writ of assistance to properly is-
sue, there must be a judgment, a sale con-
ducted according to the judgment, and a 
sheriffs deed to the property. Federal 
Land Bank of Spokane v. Heidema (1986), 
224 Mont 64, 727 P.2d 1336, 43 StRep. 
2020. The record shows that those ele-
ments were present here and met the statu-
tory requirements. We hold that the Dis-
trict Court did not err in issuing the Writ 
of Assistance. 
Affirmed. 
HARRISON, SHEEHY, HUNT and 
GULBRANDSON, JJ., concur. 
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NORTH FORK PRESERVATION 
ASSOCIATION, Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
• . 
DEPARTMENT OF STATE LANDS, a 
Department of the State of Montana, 
Defendant and Appellant, 
and 
Farmers Union Central Exchange 
(Cenex), Intervenor and 
Appellant 
No. 88-516. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
Submitted June 15, 1989. 
Decided Aug. 22, 1989. 
Rehearing Denied Sept 14, 1989. 
Environmental preservation associa-
tion brought action challenging Depart-
ment of State Lands' approval of oil and 
gas lessee's operating plan, which called 
for drilling of exploratory well on leased 
tract of school trust land within state for-
est, alleging Department failed to prepare 
environmental impact statement on pro-
posed well, and lessee intervened. The 
District Court, Eleventh Judicial District, 
Flathead County, Michael Keedy, J., en-
tered summary judgment in favor of asso-
ciation and issued writ of mandate direct-
ing Department to prepare environmental 
impact statement Department and lessee 
appealed. The Supreme Court, McDon-
ough, J., held that (1) proper standard of 
review was whether Department acted ar-
bitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully; (2) 
Department, in approving plan without re-
quiring environmental impact statement, 
did not act arbitrarily, capriciously, or un-
lawfully; and (3) mandamus was not avail-
able remedy. 
Reversed, writ of mandate dissolved, 
case remanded. 
Hunt, J., dissented and filed opinion. 
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1. Woods and Forests *»8 
Standard of review applicable to De-
partment of State Lands' approval of oil 
and gas lessee's operating plan, which 
called for drilling exploratory well on 
leased tract of school trust land within 
state forest, was whether Department act-
ed arbitrarily, capriciously, or unlawfully, 
rather than whether Department's decision 
was clearly erroneous. MCA 2-4-704, 75-
1-101 et seq., 77-1-202. 
2. Health and Environment «=J25.10(2) 
Department of State Lands acted law-
fully in approving oil and gas lessee's oper-
ating plan, which called for drilling of ex-
ploratory well on leased tract of school 
trust land within state forest, without re-
quiring environmental impact statement; 
Department followed required procedures, 
included in its preliminary environmental 
report information required by statute and 
administrative rules, and made its decision 
to forego environmental impact statement 
at point in process where that decision was 
still up to Department's discretion. MCA 
75-1-101 et seq., 75-1-201, 75^1-202. 
3. Health and Environment *=>25.10(2) 
Department of State Lands did not act 
arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding to 
approve oil and gas lessee's operating plan, 
which called for drilling of exploratory well 
on leased tract of school trust lands within 
state forest, without requiring environmen-
tal impact statement; in process of prepar-
ing preliminary environmental reports, 
there were many concerns expressed and 
much information provided, in response to 
which Department adopted mitigation mea-
sures in form of 42 protective stipulations, 
warranting conclusion that Department 
had considered concerns raised and taken 
significant steps to address them. MCA 
75-1-101 et seq. 
4. Mandamus *=»85 
Mandamus was not available to compel 
Department of State Lands to take discre-
tionary action of preparing environmental 
impact statement prior to approving oil and 
gas lessee's operating plan, which called 
for drilling of exploratory well on leased 
DEPT. OF STATE LANDS Mont. 863 
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tract of school trust land within state for-
est 
Tommy H. Butler argued, Dept. of State 
Lands, Helena, Doug James argued, Moul-
ton, Belligham, Longo & Mather, Billings, 
Dana L. Christensen, Murphy, Robinson, 
Heckathorn & Phillips, Kalispell, for appel-
lants. 
Jon L. Heberling argued, McGarvey, He-
berling, Sullivan & McGarvey, Andrew 
Bittker argued, Kalispell, for plaintiff and 
respondent. 
McDONOUGH, Justice. 
This appeal involves an oil and gas lease 
on school trust land within the Coal Creek 
State Forest, which was acquired from the 
State by the Farmers Union Central Ex-
change (Cenex). School trust lands are 
administered by the Department of State 
Lands (Department), which issued the lease 
to Cenex. Pursuant to an Annual Operat-
ing Plan approved by the Department, Ce-
nex proposes to drill an exploratory well on 
its leased tract. North Fork Preservation 
Association (North Fork) has challenged 
the Department's approval of Cenex's oper-
ating plan, alleging that the Department 
failed to prepare an environmental impact 
statement on the proposed well as required 
by law. North Fork filed its complaint in 
the District Court of the Eleventh Judicial 
District, Flathead County, and obtained a 
summary judgment in its favor. The judg-
ment set aside the Department's approval 
of Cenex's operating plan; issued a writ of 
mandate directing the Department to pre-
pare an environmental impact statement; 
and awarded costs, fees and a small money 
judgment. We reverse, and remand the 
case to the District Court for entry of 
judgment in favor of the Department. We 
hold that the District Court incorrectly ap-
plied the "clearly erroneous" standard for 
reviewing the Department's decision and 
misinterpreted applicable statutory and 
case law. We further hold that the Depart-
ment's decision was proper under the cor-
rect, "arbitrary, capricious or unlawful" 
standard of review, and that mandamus 
was not a proper remedy in this case, as 
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mandamus is not available to compel a dis-
cretionary act 
The parties have stated a number of is-
sues, some of which overlap: 
As Stated by the Department 
1. Whether the Department must pre-
pare an environmental impact statement on 
the drilling of a single exploratory well on 
school trust land which had been previously 
clear-cut of timber and is managed under 
the multiple use concept 
2. Whether the Department is required 
to prepare a site-specific environmental im-
pact statement concerning full-field oil and 
gas development 
3. Whether mandamus is an inappropri-
ate remedy to enforce the provisions of the 
Montana Environmental Policy Act , 
4. Whether North Fork Preservation 
Association sustained its burden of proof. 
As Stated by Cenex: 
1. Did the District Court apply the 
wrong standard of review in reviewing the 
State Lands' decision that approval of Ce-
nex's plan to drill one exploratory well was 
not a major action of state government 
significantly affecting the quality of the 
human environment? 
2. Whether State Lands1 decision that 
an environmental impact statement was not 
required was arbitrary and capricious. 
3. Whether the 1984 preliminary envi-
ronmental review was sufficient, as a mat-
ter of law, without considering the "cumu-
lative impacts" of oil and gas development 
and production. 
4. Whether a writ of mandamus will lie 
to compel the preparation of an environ-
mental impact statement 
As Stated by North Fork: 
1. Did the District Court apply the 
wrong standard of review to State Lands' 
procedural decision to forego an environ-
mental impact statement? 
2. Whether the Cenex operating plan 
"may significantly affect environmental at-
tributes recognized as being endangered, 
fragile, or in severely short supply." ARM 
26.2.603(3Xa). 
3. Piecemealing: At what stage in the 
oil and gas lease process is an environmen-
tal impact statement on development legal-
ly required? 
4. Is there a separate ground support-
ing the District Court's decision, which 
State Lands and Cenex did not raise on 
appeal? 
5. Whether the 1984 preliminary envi-
ronmental review was legally sufficient, 
particularly in its evaluation of cumulative 
impacts. 
6. Whether a writ of mandate Vill lie to 
compel preparation of an environmental im-
pact statement 
In April of 1975, the Department re-
ceived applications for oil and gas leases on 
14 tracts of school trust land in the Coal 
Creek State Forest The Department de-
ferred action on possible leases until an 
environmental impact statement (EIS) 
could be prepared Coal Creek State For-
est is bordered on three sides by National 
Forest Service land, and on the fourth side 
by the North Fork of the Flathead River. 
The river is part of the National Wild and 
Scenic Rivers System, as well as the west-
ern boundary of Glacier National Park. 
The surrounding National Forest Service 
land was also the subject of oil and gas 
development proposals at about the same 
time. In 1976, the National Forest Service 
issued a draft EIS concerning proposed 
leases on land in its charge. The Depart-
ment also issued an EIS in 1976. The 
introduction to the Department's EIS stat-
ed that the National Forest Service EIS 
dealt with the impacts of oil and gas leas-
ing in the larger area surrounding Coal 
Creek, and the Department's EIS would 
therefore focus only on the state lands 
involved and should be considered "an ex-
tension of that made by the federal govern-
ment" The Department's EIS permitted 
leasing of all 14 Coal Creek tracts. How-
ever, at a meeting of the State Board of 
Land Commissioners held in March of 1976, 
all of the bids received were rejected. The 
National Forest Service subsequently un-
NORTH FORK PRES. • 
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dertook a new environmental analysis of 
the area, and abandoned its 1976 draft EIS. 
In 1982, the Department received new 
applications for ofl and gas leases covering 
a larger portion of the Coal Greek area. 
The Department prepared a preliminary en-
vironmental review (PER) for the purpose 
of determining whether issuance of oil and 
gas leases would be an action by state 
government "significantly affecting the 
quality of the human environment," there-
fore requiring an EIS under § 75-1-201, 
MCA. The PER was issued in 1983, and 
concluded that no such significant effect 
would result if certain protective stipula-
tions were included in any leases granted. 
The Department then offered leases in 
Coal Creek State Forest at public auction. 
Cenex purchased leases to 17 tracts. Each 
lease contained 16 environmentally protec-
tive stipulations. Under these stipulations, 
Cenex was required to submit an annual 
operating plan to the Department detailing 
all activities to be carried out on the leased 
acreage during the coming year. No activi-
ty could be undertaken untfl written ap-
proval of each year's plan was received 
from the Department 
Cenex's first annual operating plan was 
submitted in 1984. The plan proposed drill-
ing an exploratory well on one of the 
leased tracts located approximately three 
miles south of the town of Polebridge and 
one mOe west of Glacier Park. The pro-
posed well site was a clear-cut left from 
previous logging under lease from the De-
partment Cenex planned to make im-
provements to an existing logging road in 
order to transport necessary drilling equip-
ment and supplies. The Department de-
layed approval of the plan while it complet-
ed a site-specific PER, held two public 
hearings and received comments on the 
PER during a 30-day review period. After 
reviewing the comments, the Department 
issued a supplement to the PER. The De-
partment then approved the plan, subject 
to 31 additional protective stipulations. 
In February of 1985, North Fork filed 
this action. The complaint sought an order 
setting aside the Department's approval of 
the Cenex operating plan and the Cenex 
DEPT. OF STATE LANDS Mont g £ 5 
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lease, and a writ of mandate directing the 
Department to prepare an EIS on the cu-
mulative effects of ofl and gas development 
in the Coal Creek area. Cenex successfully 
petitioned to intervene as a defendant in 
the case. The Department and Cenex filed 
a motion for summary judgment, as did 
North Fork. In 1988, the District Court 
issued a Memorandum and Order granting 
North Fork's motion, and subsequently en-
tered judgment in North Fork's favor. 
This appeal followed 
The many issues taken up by the parties 
have rendered their arguments difficult to 
follow. North Fork has gone so far as to 
attempt a "chart of corresponding issue 
numbers" in its brief to this Court A 
careful reading of the issues and argu-
ments offered, as well as the record from 
below, shows that the parties are posing 
three core questions: 
1. Did the District Court apply the prop-
er standard of review? 
2. Did the Department proceed properly 
in approving Cenex's annual operating 
plan? 
3. Is mandamus an appropriate remedy 
to enforce provisions of the Montana Envi-
ronmental Policy Act? 
We will proceed with our review by ad-
dressing these three questions. 
[1] The District Court looked to the 
Montana Administrative Procedure Act 
(MAPA) for its standard of review. The 
court applied the standard of review found 
in § 2-4-704{2Xe), MCA: 
(2) . . . The court may reverse or modify 
the decision if substantial rights of the 
appellant have been prejudiced because 
the administrative findings, inferences, 
conclusions, or decisions are: 
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reli-
able, probative, and substantial evidence 
on the whole record. 
On appeal, the Department and Cenex ar-
gue that the "clearly erroneous" standard 
was improper in this case. Cenex specifi-
cally argues that § 2-4-704, MCA, was in-
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applicable, because the section deals with 
judicial review of "contested cases", and 
this was not a contested case. A "contest-
ed case" is defined at § 2-4-102(4), MCA, 
as a proceeding before an agency where a 
"determination of legal rights, duties, or 
privileges" of a party is required to be 
made after an opportunity for hearing. In 
contrast to cases such as State ex rel 
Montana Wilderness Association v. 
Board of Natural Resources and Conser-
vation (1982), 200 Mont 11, 648 P.2d 734, 
no hearing was requested or held before 
the Department in this case. North Fork 
did not initiate this action until after the 
Department had approved Cenex's operat-
ing plan. There was no "evidentiary 
record" against which to measure the De-
partment's decision and determine whether 
it was clearly erroneous. Cenex is there-
fore correct in asserting that § 2-4-704, 
MCA, does not apply in this case. 
Both Cenex and the Department argue 
that the District Court should have em-
ployed an "arbitrary and capricious" stan-
dard. The Department asserts that deci-
sions by administrative agencies are given 
deference by reviewing courts due to the 
agencies' access to superior expertise, and 
are not overturned unless arbitrary or ca-
pricious. The Department notes that in 
Wilderness Association, 648 P.2d at 740, 
this Court cited deference to agency exper-
tise as one of three important factors in 
selecting a standard of review in a contest-
ed case. Cenex notes that the arbitrary 
and capricious standard was used prior to 
the enactment of MAPA, and would logical-
ly apply in this case. Our decision in Lan-
gen v. Badlands Cooperative State Graz-
ing District (1951), 125 Mont 302, 308, 234 
P.2d 467, 470, which is cited by Cenex, is 
relevant to both points: 
The review by the district court is only 
for the purpose of determining the legal 
rights of the parties involved. This is so 
because of the division of governmental 
powers under the Constitution, neither 
the district court nor the Supreme Court 
may substitute their discretion for the 
discretion reposed in boards and commis-
sions by the legislative acts, [citations] 
The appeal from the commission to the 
district court is for the purpose merely of 
determining whether upon the evidence 
and the law the action of the commission 
is based upon an error of law, or is 
wholly unsupported by the evidence, or 
clearly arbitrary or capricious. On such 
review courts will only inquire insofar as 
to ascertain if the board or commission 
has stayed within the statutory bounds 
and has not acted arbitrarily, capriciously 
or unlawfully, [citations] 
Both sides agree that because the Mon-
tana Environmental Policy Act (MEPA) is 
modeled after its federal counterpart 
(NEPA), this Court can look to federal deci-
sions under NEPA as an aid to addressing 
cases under MEPA. See Kadillak v. Ana-
conda Co. (1979), 184 Mont 127, 602 P.2d 
147. In fact, North Fork argues that we 
should adopt the "reasonableness" stan-
dard utilized by the U.S. Court of Appeals 
for the Ninth Circuit in cases cited in North 
Fork's brief. While looking to federal deci-
sions is not always conclusive, cases decid-
ed on analogous facts can shed light on a 
given issue. 
The United States Supreme CJourt recent-
ly took up two companion cases involving 
the issues at bar. In one of those cases; 
Marsh v. Oregon Natural Resources 
Council — U.S. , 109 S.Ct 1851, 104 
L.Ed.2d 377 (1989), the Supreme Court ad-
dressed the issue of the proper standard 
for review of an agency decision not to 
amend a previously-issued EIS. The argu-
ment before the Court was that newly-dis-
covered information cast doubt on the 
agency's previous conclusion tjiat the pro-
posed project would not significantly affect 
the environment The agency involved had 
decided that the information did not raise 
questions sufficient to require amendment 
of the EIS. 
This case presents an analogous ques-
tion. North Fork alleged several specific 
shortcomings in the procedure followed by 
the Department in approving Cenex's annu-
al operating plan. The thrust of these 
contentions, when taken together, is that 
the information gathered by the Depart 
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ment indicated that Cenex's proposed well 
would generate a significant impact on the 
human environment, and an EIS should 
have been prepared. 
As in any comparison between federal 
and Montana law, there is a distinction 
between Marsh and this case. In Marsh, 
the federal Administrative Procedure Act 
was applicable where in this case MAP A 
judicial review provisions do not apply. 
However, the federal act offers several 
possible standards of review. In choosing 
a standard, the Supreme Court in Marsh 
specifically rejected the "reasonableness" 
standard used by the Ninth Circuit Court 
of Appeals and adopted the "arbitrary and 
capricious" standard. In explaining its 
choice, the Court stated: 
The question presented for review in 
this case is a classic example of a factual 
dispute the resolution of which implicates 
substantial agency expertise Be-
cause analysis of the relevant documents 
"requires a high level of technical exper-
tise," we must defer to "the informed 
discretion of the responsible federal 
agencies." [citations] 
The Department in this case was carry-
ing out its statutorily-imposed fiduciary 
duty to "secure the largest measure of 
legitimate and reasonable advantage to the 
state" in managing school trust lands. 
Section 77-1-202, MCA. The Department 
also had to carry out duties imposed by 
MEPA, pursuant to which it prepared a 
PER in order to gather information for its 
decision on whether to prepare an ELS for 
Cenex's proposed action. This decision 
necessarily involved expertise not pos-
sessed by courts and is part of a duty 
assigned to the Department, not the courts. 
In light of this, and the cases cited above, 
we hold that the standard of review to be 
applied by the trial court and this Court is 
whether the record establishes that the 
agency acted arbitrarily, capriciously, or 
unlawfully. 
n. 
When applying the above standard of 
review to this case, it is important to keep 
in mind which Department action is chal-
DEPT. C^ F STATE LANDS Mont 867 
862 (Moot, tttt) 
lenged by North Fork: the approval of 
Cenex9 Annual Operating Plan, which calls 
for the drilling of an exploratory well. 
North Fork has contended, and the District 
Court has held, that this action should not 
have been undertaken without prior prepa-
ration of an EIS. It is apparent from our 
review of the record, however, that the 
arguments of counsel and the District 
Court's Memorandum and Order have 
strayed from the issue of the operating 
plan to consider policies and activities that 
are not at issue here. This is a primary 
reason for our reversal of the District 
Court's judgment 
A. The Department's Decision Was Not 
Unlawful 
[21 While the standard of review we 
have adopted utilizes three terms, it breaks 
down into two basic parts. One part con-
cerns whether the agency action could be 
held unlawful, and the other concerns 
whether it could be held arbitrary or capri-
cious. See Langen, 234 P.2d at 471. We 
will first address the "unlawful" portion. 
The Department is both empowered and 
constrained by a set of statutes and regula-
tions relevant to its actions challenged in 
this case. One such statute is § 77-1-202, 
MCA, cited above, which imposes a fiduci-
ary duty on the Department to manage the 
land at issue to the advantage of the State. 
The procedures followed by the Depart-
ment in its dealings with Cenex were gov-
erned in part by MEPA (§§ 75-1-101, et 
seq., MCA) and administrative rules enact-
ed pursuant to MEPA (ARM 26.2.602, et 
seq. repealed 11/1/89; recodified at ARM 
26.2.642, et seq.). 
North Fork's complaint in the District 
Court alleged in large part that the Depart-
ment failed to carry out its appointed 
duties under these provisions. In the brief 
filed in support of its motion for summary 
judgment, North Fork made three argu-
ments: 
1. [The Department's] decision to fore-
go an EIS at the stage of drilling an oil 
well was clearly unreasonable and 
wrong. Conner v. Burford, 605 F-Supp. 
107 (Dlfontl985) and Kadiliak v. Ana-
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conda Co. (1979), 184 Mont 127, 602 
P.2d 147. 
2. The case is clearly one where the 
decision "may significantly affect" en-
dangered species and a fragile environ-
ment, requiring an EIS under ARM 26.2.-
603(3Xa). 
3. [The Department] omitted to perform 
an evaluation of cumulative impacts, in 
violation of ARM 26.2.604(l)(b) and (c). 
Two of these arguments, the first and 
third, are directly relevant to the "unlaw-
ful" portion of our standard of review. 
The District Court's Reliance on Con-
ner v. BurfonL The District Court agreed 
with North Fork's first argument, and re-
lied on Conner v. Burford, supra, to hold 
the Department's 1976 EIS, 1983 PER and 
1984 PER to be insufficient. At the outset, 
the court adopted North Fork's broad view 
of the development of oil and gas in the 
Coal Creek area, and concluded that full-
field development required the preparation 
of an EIS. The Department had argued 
that its 1976 EIS was sufficient for this 
purpose. The court found, however, that 
the 1976 EIS was insufficient because it 
focused only on Coal Creek lease tracts and 
did not address the overall impacts of such 
development Without a valid EIS, the two 
PER's became "falling dominos," their en-
vironmentally protective stipulations mere 
examples of the kind of "piecemeal" ap-
proach to environmental review held im-
proper in Conner. We disagree. 
First, the Department's 1976 EIS has no 
relevance to this case. The overall impacts 
of full-field oil and gas development in the 
Coal Creek State Forest are not at issue. 
Section 7&-1-201, MCA, (entitled "General 
Directions—Environmental Impact State-
ments") sets out guidelines for "every rec-
ommendation or report on proposals for 
projects." ARM 26.2.603 ("Determination 
of Necessity for Environmental Impact 
Statement") governs consideration of a 
"proposed action". The proposed 
project/action under consideration in this 
case is the drilling of one exploratory well 
on one lease tract In considering this 
proposed action, the Department prepared 
a site-specific PER in 1984, which supple-
mented a more general PER prepared in 
1983. The conclusion reached by the De-
partment was that an EIS was not required 
for the single Cenex test well. This is the 
decision under review. 
Second, while the District Court was cor-
rect in asserting that "[i]f found rich in oil 
and gas the acreage in question would be 
under tremendous pressure for further ex-
ploration and development," it was prema-
ture in concluding that an EIS was re-
quired. The court's conclusion apparently 
resulted from a misreading of the Conner 
case. The decision of the U.S. District 
Court for the District of Montana in Con-
ner, cited by North Fork in its brief below, 
dealt with the question of when an agency 
action would "significantly affect" the en-
vironment, thus requiring preparation of an 
EIS. This is the same standard employed 
in § 75-1-201, MCA, and its attendant reg-
ulations. The Federal District Court held 
that issuance of a lease permitting oil and 
gas development was "the first stage of a 
number of successive steps" leading to de-
velopment, and therefore met the "signifi-
cantly affect" standard. The court feared 
that proceeding with a piecemeal environ-
mental review by considering only one step 
at a time would ignore the cumulative ef-
fects of development and risk unforeseen, 
irreversible impacts. 
When reviewing the decision, however, 
the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals made an 
important distinction. The appellate court 
reviewed case law determining that under 
the "significantly affect" standard, an EIS 
was always required at the "go/no go" 
point of oil and gas development The test 
derived to pinpoint when the "go/no go" 
point is reached looks for the proposed 
action that will entaO an "irretrievable com-
mitment of resources". Some of the leases 
at issue in Conner had "no surface occu-
pancy" (NSO) clauses. Under these claus-
es, no activity which would disturb the 
ground in any way could be undertaken 
without prior approval from the agency 
involved. The Ninth Circuit Court held 
that leases with NSO clauses were not an 
irretrievable commitment of resources. 
Nothing could happen under the leases 
without government approval. The point 
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had not been reached where preparation of (Emphasis supplied.) It is 
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an EIS was "automatic." The court also 
noted, "We cannot assume that govern-
ment agencies will not comply with their 
NEPA obligations in later stages of devel-
opment" Conner v. Burford, 836 F.2d 
1521 at 1528 (9th Cir.1988). 
Cenex will operate under essentially the 
same type of strictures found in the Con-
ner NSO leases. The lease at issue in this 
case was executed on a printed "Montana 
Oil and Gas Lease" form supplemented in 
blank spaces with information specific to 
the lease arrangement between the Depart-
ment and Cenex for this well site. North 
Fork has made much of the printed lan-
guage in the initial portion of the lease 
indicating that Cenex thereby acquires the 
right to do the following: 
. . . mining and operating for oil and gas, 
and of laying pipelines, building tanks, 
power stations, and other structures 
thereon necessary in order to produce, 
save, care for, dispose of and remove the 
oil and gas . . . 
According to North Fork, it is hard to 
imagine these activities not significantly 
affecting the human environment of the 
Coal Creek area. 
North Fork is correct in that the lease 
could ultimately empower Cenex to conduct 
all of the listed activities, and it is easy to 
imagine these activities having a signifi-
cant effect on the environment However, 
the lease also contains specific environmen-
tal stipulations typed into the lease form 
x r__, . . & fundamental 
principle of contract law that written or 
typewritten provisions in a contract take 
precedence over printed provisions. Hoer-
ner Waldorf Corp. v. Bumstead-Woolford 
Co. (1972), 158 Mont 472, 494 P.2d 293. 
The typed "special provision" therefore 
takes precedence over the printed authori-
zation in this lease. Cenex can carry out 
the listed activities only with prior written 
approval of the Department. The issuance 
of this lease was thus not an "irretrievable 
commitment of resources" as the term was 
used in Conner. The District Court was 
incorrect in concluding that full develop-
ment of oil and gas in the Coal Creek State 
Forest was a matter of successive steps set 
into irreversible motion by the issuance of 
the lease. Lake the Ninth Circuit in Con-
ner, this Court cannot assume that the 
Department will not comply with its MEPA 
obligations if development proceeds beyond 
this stage. 
The 1983 PER. The District Court's mis-
application of the Conner decision also 
tainted its holdings that the 1983 and 1984 
PER's were insufficient Because the 1984 
PER is a "supplement" to the 1983 PER, 
the court's holdings on both documents are 
relevant The court held the 1983 PER 
inadequate because it relied on the inclu-
sion of environmentally protective stipula-
tions to support its finding that issuing 
leases would not significantly affect the 
human environment The District Court 
held this approach insufficient for two rea-
sons: (1) it represented piecemealing pro-
hibited by Conner and (2) it should have 
tai Stipulations vyprru w w w«^ «^ <-~w . u*^ «v^ x» ~ , w~ 
under paragraph 26, entitled "Special Pro- been a "programmatic" review as required 
visions". One of these typed stipulations by ARM 26.2.614 
reads: 
If the lessee .[Cenex] intends to conduct 
any activities on the leased premises, it 
shall submit to the Department of State 
Lands two copies of an Annual Operat-
ing Plan or Amendment to an existing 
Operating Plan, describing its proposed 
activities for the coming year. No activ-
ities shall occur on the tract until an 
Annuai Operating Plan or Amend-
ments have been approved in writing 
by the Commissioner of State Lands or 
his designated representative. 
Our discussion of Conner has shown 
that a lease issued pursuant to the 1983 
PER need not be violative of the ruling in 
Conner, and the lease involved here in fact 
was not As to ARM 26.2.614, the court 
engaged in selective reading of this rule, 
which has resulted in misinterpretation. 
The court and North Fork have at several 
points focused on portions of relevant pro-
visions utilizing the words "shall" or 
"must" to conclude that the Department 
failed to carry out mandatory procedures. 
However, a cursory examination of ARM 
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26.2.614 reveals that the procedures listed 
are subject to a very prominent "if*: 
(1) If the department is contemplating a 
series of agency-initiated actions [which] 
will constitute a major state action signif-
icantly affecting the human environment, 
the department may prepare a program-
matic review . . . 
(Emphasis supplied.) Again, our discussion 
above shows that the contemplated action 
at issue in the 1983 PER was the issuance 
of leases, which the Department deter-
mined did not constitute state actions sig-
nificantly affecting the human environ-
ment That decision was not challenged by 
North Fork, so no programmatic review 
was required. 
The 1984 PER. The District Court 
adopted North Fork's third argument in 
holding the 1984 PER to be insufficient 
North Fork asserted that under ARM 26.2.-
604, an evaluation of the cumulative im-
pacts of the proposed action was mandato-
ry. The District Court found the 1984 PER 
insufficient because of its failure to ad-
dress cumulative impacts. 
The term "cumulative impacts" is de-
fined in ARM 26.2.602(1). The rule states 
that analysis of cumulative impacts under 
this definition involves consideration of 
past and present actions related to the pro-
posed action. The proposed action under 
consideration in the 1984 PER was the 
drilling of the test well, the first such well 
in the Coal Creek area. The only past 
related action was the issuance of leases to 
Cenex, which was the subject of the 1983 
PER. The 1983 and 1984 PER's fulfill the 
requirement of ARM 26.2.604 in that they 
examine the impacts of issuing leases and 
drilling a single test well, the only related 
proposed actions before the Department 
The arguments advanced by North Fork 
and the District Court's Memorandum at-
tack the 1984 PER for failing to consider 
the cumulative impacts of related future 
actions, namely the full-field development 
of oil and gas. However, ARM 26.2.604 
requires consideration of related future ac-
tions only when they are under current 
consideration. As we stated above, full-
field development was not a proposed ac-
tion before the Department It was not 
included in Cenex's Annual Operating Plan, 
and therefore was not under "current con-
sideration". 
In sum, the arguments advanced by 
North Fork and the rationale provided by 
the District Court failed to show that the 
Department acted "unlawfully** in deter-
mining that approval of Cenex' first annual 
operating plan did not require an EIS. Our 
review of the record has not uncovered any 
statute or regulation violated by the De-
partment in its dealings with Cenex thus 
far. The Department has followed re-
quired procedures and included in its 
PER's the information required by statute 
and administrative rules. Nor can the deci-
sion on the Cenex test well be analogized to 
the situation in Conner. Even under the 
Conner criteria, the Department made its 
decision to forego an EIS at a point in the 
process where that decision was ^till left to 
the Department's discretion. We! therefore 
proceed to examine the Department's deci-
sion under the "arbitrary or capricious" 
portion of our standard of revie^v. 
B. The Department's Decision Was Not 
Arbitrary Or Capricious. 
[3] North Fork's second argument in its 
brief in support of its motion for summary 
judgment addressed the 1984 PEfe, and is 
relevant to this portion of our review. 
North Fork asserted that by the Depart-
ment's own analysis, the approval of the 
well was an action significantly affecting 
the human environment North Fork is 
critical of the Department's treatment of 
the effects the well might have! on bald 
eagles, grizzly bears or greyi wolves 
thought to inhabit or at least frequent the 
Coal Creek area. North Fork notes that 
the Department employs no eagle biologist 
or wolf biologist, and no wildlife biologist is 
included in the list of PER preparers. 
However, North Fork's brief states, 
The issue here is not the questionable 
quality of the [eagle, bear and wolf] biol-
ogy in the PER. The issue is whether 
there is a "may affect" situation . . . 
According to North Fork, such a situation 
"clearly" exists, and an EIS should have 
been prepared prior to a 
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In response to this process, the Depart-
ment decided to include measures to miti-
gate the impact of oil and gas activities in 
the form of stipulations to Cenex's lease 
and to the written approval of Cenex's op-
erating plan. The Department has argued 
that these stipulations prevented its ap-
proval of the operating plan from rising to 
the level of a state action significantly af-
fecting the human environment At the 
federal level, the Ninth Circuit Court of 
Appeals has held that such "mitigation 
measures" are to be considered in review-
ing a decision to forego an EIS, and if the 
measures are "significant", they may justi-
fy such a decision under the "unreason-
able" standard. Friends of Endangered 
Species, Inc. v. Jantzen (9th Cir.1985), 760 
F.2d 976, 987. Given the narrower, "arbi-
trary or capricious" standard being applied 
in this case, sufficiently significant mitiga-
tion measures certainly would justify the 
Department's decision. 
The mitigation measures adopted by the 
Department have taken the form of a total 
of 42 protective stipulations, 11 attached to 
the lease and 31 attached to the approval of 
the operating plan. They include such 
measures as forbidding any activity on the 
lease tract during times of the year impor-
tant to bald eagle nesting and grizzly bear 
migration. The drilling rig must be paint-
ed a color that will not stand out against 
the natural background, additional muf-
flers must be installed on the diesel en-
gines used to power the rig, and the en-
gines must be mounted facing a certain 
direction to reduce the noise reaching bald 
eagle nests and Glacier Park. Five stipula-
tions deal with any necessary disturbance 
of the soil and its replacement Eight stip-
ulations concern maintaining the quality of 
the ground water, and include restrictions 
on the chemical content of drilling fluids 
and the size of trucks that may be used to 
haul diesel fuel to the rig. The stipulations 
also address the workers on the rig, impos-
ing regulations on garbage disposal and 
forbidding the presence of personal pets, 
among other measures. 
We have reviewed the concerns raised by 
the preparers of the PER's, as well as 
those raised by agencies consulted and 
members of the public. We have also re-
viewed the mitigation measures imposed by 
the Department We conclude that the De-
partment has considered the concerns 
raised and taken significant steps to ad-
dress them. We therefore hold that the 
Department's decision to approve Cenex's 
annual operating plan was not arbitrary, 
nor was it an exercise of caprice. Having 
also held that the Department did not act 
illegally, we therefore uphold the Depart-
ment's decision and reverse the District 
Court on this question. 
III. 
[4] One of the remedies afforded by the 
District Court was a writ of mandate re-
quiring the Department to prepare an EIS. 
We have held above that an EIS was not 
requited in this case, which makes the is-
suance of the writ erroneous. We feel 
compelled to add, however, that mandamus 
was an inappropriate remedy in this case. 
As our discussion above has brought out, 
the Department's decision to forego an EIS 
at this stage of development was necessar-
ily an exercise of discretion to which courts 
must give a measure of deference. In fact, 
we have previously held that the Depart-
ment must exercise its discretion in all 
phases of its management of state lands. 
"If the 'large measure of legitimate and 
reasonable advantage' from the use of 
state land is to accrue to the state, then 
the [Department] must, necessarily, have 
a large discretionary power. Every facet 
of the [Department's] action cannot, and 
is not, explicitly laid out in the statutes 
of the State Constitution." 
Jeppeson t?. State (1983), 205 Mont 282, 
289, 667 P.2d 428, 431 (quoting Thompson 
v. Babcock (1966), 147 Mont 46, 409 P.2d 
808). We held in Jeppeson that mandamus 
is not available to compel a discretionary 
act We therefore reverse the District 
Court on this question. 
We have held that the District Court 
applied the incorrect standard of review in 
this case, and that under the correct stan-
dard, the Department's approval of Cenex's 
annual operating plan was proper. We 
have further 
available in ' 
verse the de 
dissolve the ? 




and PETER 1 
Judge*, conct 
HUNT, Jus 
I dissent r. 
judgment in f 
affirmed. 
The majorit 
drilled in the 
cated on the 
River, will not 
impact upon tl 
require the pr 
tal Impact St 
question, how 
the right to ( 
empowers the 
er activities i 
development-
tanks, constru 






restrictive pro^  
submit annual! 
ten approval b 
nex undertake: 
tal activity, tl 
eludes that th< 
case is the im] 
more than one, 
here. This w< 
toward the ful 
in the Coal C 
Cenex discovei 
well, as is hig 
pressure for ft 
ment of the ar 
the majority U 
ment is not at 
* Sitting for SHE 
f l W e *»*' also re. 
ST**0-? 
£«Pprove Ce„ex.8 
J 8 8 *>t arbitrary 
U
^
n e n t
 *d not aef 
" - the D h S 
s
 forded by the 
o f
 mandate re-
Prepare an ElS 
h m a
* « the is-
•to mandamus 















 o f 

















NORTH FORK P R E s . „ 
*«ve further ^ a u M 7 7 8 F ^ 
• l iab le in this £ « "^darnus was
 n o t 
J?** the decision^/ ^ r n . ^ ^ o r e re-
^soJve the writ of m. A D l 8 t r i c t Court. 
^ e n t i n ^ ^ c - ^ e n t j y o f 
M r e \ concur. K A P K ° C H , District 
* * * . Just.ce, dissenting 
"
t e d
 * the North S ! ? S P o r e s t . *• 
**«•. will not general . ? t h e ^ e a d 
»*•« »*>» the h u ^ * 8 u c h • "significant 
^ u i r e the p r e n a S enviroWnent" as to 
« impact £ S S S ^ » S'vironnten 
Quesfon, however n o f f - ™e , e ** « 
1,16
 ^ h t to drill W L°n,y « * « Cenex 
e
»Powere thetlZtSl !" ** ' * also 
T fWtfc . a s s S ^ ^ m o t h -
deveJopment~lav,W ^ ^ o i l and *as 
^nks, c o n s t r u c ^ ^ m e s , build^ 
er necessary s t ruc turT J * * ? and oth* 
exploratory well nJvT S h o u , d this one 
J * ™ * , that will S i f • c * " ' * 8 -
""man e n v i ^ i ^ ^ y *f**t the 
Taking comfort ^ .. 
^ t r ic t i v e p r o v i s7 0* * • W . seemingly 
«*«"* annually r o ^ 9 ^ ^ ^ to 
ten app r o v a J b / £ g ^ j plan for ^ 
• « undertakes wy
 a S t m ! D t ***>«> Ce-
c ? **vity, t h e ^ a S v n a , d e V e , 0 ^ » -
* * • that the o n T y S T " * * <»»• 
**
e
 » the impact J X * • " * ' * *» this 
tt
°re than one s i t e ! ^ °De We»- Much 
h e
*- This w;u t 8 P e C t f i c w e« is at state 
^ a r d the f u T S e v e , ^ * * * * ^ £ 
^ ^ c ^ r f c r f f a n d ^ 
^ n e x d i ^ ^ ° » t e F 0 t Should 
WeU
' «s is higHy" ? wW" ^ one 
^ t o f t h e a r e a w a f ^ ^ ^ e l o p . 
£ majority
 to befeve th^ n , e n ? U 8 - ^ 
ttent
 • not at issue L ^ l , U C h deve,<>P-
* ^ f o r s „ E E H y . ; . , 8 i n c o m p r e h ^ e . 
J; ^ StZoSl^Tan EIS ^  »ot 
a ^ M - commitment^
 0f " ^ •" '<ir«-
4tnWable
 TOmtSen 0 7 0 U f c e s ' ' A» 
f«rs at the »g0/no _™!,en* .o f Sources oc-
development $ * ^ <* oil and gas 
* * * of Cenex^ s I t D e p a r t n , ^ t ' s ap-
Pfcratory well w ^ v to ^ ° n e « 
*fno ?o" pomt Th. J e , , r e a c h e d this 
H on Coal Cr^ ek ? e . d n I % of one
 oi, 
*"*•»« of t h e ^ d T t i t U t e s a dis-
*" irreWevable £ T a"d ' defmitionalJy 
^ EIS must Urrj^f ° f ^ " - e s . * 
>ar tment a p p l e s
 a« **»» ^^ 
P ^ that i n c K I " 8 n n U a I °P«*k* 
^
h e
^ the p ^ f*"^ to ^ 
twenty. P P0881 tt ^ one well or 
The immediate anw u 
« * » in the c l a T c i T s t r ? * ^ 
^ « the humanVd
 n h *
 P
°
r e s t
 ^
J 
^ t are potently devast? e n W r ° n -
loosing to review r * " * - Yet, by u
^r the *£%£,?? ^ W ^ 
^ e w - t h e a r b i ^ !f a , .8 t a n dards of 
^ u l s t a n d a r d ^ e 7 ^ " 0 1 0 " 8 and un-
tent to
 I« the future o f ? " ? 8 P P e a r e "» • 
non^ected public ^ . f W " * h a n d s o f 
« - ^ P a r t m e n ^ ^ r f f ? " - . W h « ' -
» * «f «venue S ? i n o n f t r to ^^ rais-
environment, I c a n Z 7* q u a l i ty of our 
" ^ c , ^ r D
8
e
h a ^ e m a J 0 n V s 
^^tely carrying ont * ? ? , a e n t fe ade-
" ^ u r e U*Zg™'* ^ i a r y duty
 to 
^ ^ o n a b i e S v ^ t a ^ J « * * « . 
**—»* «chooi m « tadJ ^ 8 t a t e " « 
^ t e ' l l L ? 0 ^ * %»' ^nVes 
« N teeming witt S v ^ • « • «" 
«»teway to Glal'eTS J ? ^ ^^B the 
^ Flathead C ^ ? ' the N o r t n ^ r k of 
- p f o f t h f ^ d c h r o n , r ^ -
tem but also fe^, «™ S06010 Rver Sys-
^ ^ ^ . ^ c Flatbed 
^ be willing £ £ £ ? '** DePartment 
«res w i t h o u t g t a t m ? a 0 , t £ ? , « » treas-
f u t u r e
- I . f o r o n r i ^ n ? a r d J , 0 o k « the 
Partment's bastylT^l C°n d°D e ^ De-
^ ^ ' " ^ ^ d e r e d decision 
874 Mont 778 PACIFIC REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
to allow drilling prior to the compilation of 
an EIS. 
I would affirm the District Court 
lO finmMKISY*TlM> 
Julius R. TRESCH and Joan Tresch, 
Husband and Wife, Plaintiffs 
and Appellants, 
NORWEST BANK OF LEWISTOWN, 
N.A^ John Doe Corporation, I through 
V, and John Doe 1 through 10, Defen-
dants and Respondents. 
No. 89-053. 
Supreme Court of Montana. 
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Decided Aug. 25, 1989. 
Farmer brought action against lender 
when lender refused to advance additional 
loan money. The District Court, Tenth Ju-
dicial District, Fergus County, Peter Rap-
koch, J., granted lender's summary judg-
ment motion, and farmer appealed. The 
Supreme Court, McDonough, J., held that 
(1) lender did not breach implied covenant 
of good faith and fair dealing, and (2) lend-
er did not breach fiduciary duty. 
Affirmed. 
1. Banks and Banking *»100 
Lender bank did not breach any im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing when it refused to advance farmer ad-
ditional loan money for milking equipment 
lender determined was unnecessary. 
2. Banks and Banking *=»100 
Lender's decision not to advance farm-
er additional loan money to purchase milk-
ing equipment was not a breach of fiduci-
ary duty when it based decision on conclu-
sion that farmer's proposed machine pur-
chase would not cure health problem of 
dairy herd and that new machines would 
not generate sufficient additional income to 
repay loan. 
Torger S. Oaas, Lewistown, for plaintiffs 
and appellants. 
Donald C. Robinson and Mark W. Hattio-
li, Poore, Roth and Robinson, Butte, for 
defendants and respondents. 
MCDONOUGH, justice. 
Julius Tresch and Joan Tresch (Tresch) 
appeal from an order of the Tenth Judicial 
District, Fergus County, granting summa-
ry judgment to respondent Norwest Bank 
of Lewistown, NA. (Norwest). We affirm. 
The issues in this case are: 
1. Whether Norwest breached the im-
plied covenant of good faith and fair deal-
ing when it denied a $3,100.00 Joan request-
ed by Tresch. 
2. Whether Norwest breached a fiduci-
ary duty owed Tresch when it denied the 
$3,100.00 loan. 
Julius and Joan Tresch have owned and 
operated a dairy farm near Lewistown, 
Montana since 1966. For over three dec-
ades, they have done their banking busi-
ness with Norwest In 1983, Tresch in-
creased his operating loan at Norwest to 
the amount of approximately $147,000.00. 
This note was to be paid in monthly install-
ments and was secured by an assignment 
of proceeds from the dairy, and other col-
lateral. One of the terms of this financing 
agreement provided that Tresch could not 
make any capital purchase in excess of 
$500.00 without the express consent of 
Norwest 
Shortly after receiving this loan, Tresch 
used advanced funds to upgrade the equip-
ment in his dairy. This upgrading included 
the purchase of new milking machines. 
Tresch quickly became dissatisfied with 
these machines, because he believed that 
they were responsible for an outbreak of 
"mastitis" in his dairy herd. 
Mastitis is defined as an inflammation of 
the mammary glands in dairy cattle. It is 
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Heron, Burchette, Ruckert & Rothwell 
by Kenneth C. Sundlof, Jr., Douglas G. 
JZimmerinan, Gary L. Lassen, Phoenix, for 
petitioner. 
Robert K. Corbin, Atty. Gen. by Melinda 
JL Gai+ahan, Michael N. Harrison, Phoenix, 
for real party in interest. 
Larry J. Richmond, Ltd. by Larry J. 
Jlichm^nd, Julie M. Lemmon, Phoenix, for 
amicus curiae Flood Control Dist. of Mari-
copa Qounty. 
Johnson & Shelley by J. LaMar Shelley, 
Robert M. Jarrett, Jr., Phoenix, for amicus 
curiae League of Arizona Cities and Towns. 
DEER VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL 
DISTRICT NO. 97 OF MARICOPA 
COUNTY, Petitioner, 
v. 
SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizo-
na, In and For the COUNTY OF MARI-
COPA, Honorable Ruth Hilliard, a 
Judge Thereof, Respondent Judge, 
STATE of Arizona, ex rel., Robert K. 
LANE, Commissioner, State Land 
Department, Real Party in Interest. 
No. CV-8S-0577-T. 
dcr AJLS. 
to a party 
ex rel Cor-
15 ?2d 727 
Supreme Court of Arizona. 
June 30, 1988. 
Reconsideration Denied Sept. 20, 1988. 
School district filed action seeking to 
condemn parcel owned by state school 
trust. The Superior Court of Maricopa 
County, Ruth Hilliard, J., dismissed com-
plaint, and district appealed. Upon trans-
fer of appeal, the Supreme Court, Feldman, 
V.CJ., held that Arizona-New Mexico En-
abling Act did not prevent acquisition of 
school trust property by condemnation, but 
State Constitution did. 
Affirmed. 
1. Eminent Domain *»47(1) 
Under the Arizona-New Mexico En-
abling Act, Arizona school district could 
acquire parcel of school trust land by con-
demnation without complying with the 
Act's express language regarding public 
notice and public auction. Enabling Act, 
§ 28, 36 Stat 557. 
2. Eminent Domain *=>47(1) 
Under the Arizona Constitution, Arizo-
na school district could not acquire parcel 
of school trust land by condemnation be-
cause such acquisition would not allow ad-
ditional profit to trust that might come 
from competitive bidding at advertised pub-
lic auction. A.R.S. Const. Art 10, § 1 et 
seq. 
7»P.2*-13 
Arizona School Boards Ass'n by Robert 
% Jarfett, Jr., Phoenix, for amicus curiae 
Arizona School Boards Assn. 
FELt)MAN, Vice Chief Justice. 
This case requires us to review the pro-
priety of a school district's condemnation of 
state school trust land, a matter of first 
impression in our state. We transferred 
the appeal to this court to examine impor-
tant questions concerning the disposition of 
our state school trust lands. Rule 19, Ariz. 
R.Civ.App.P., 17A A.R.S. We have juris-
diction under Ariz. Const, art. 6, § 5(3) and 
A.R.S. $ 12-120.24. 
FACTUAL AND 
PROCEDURAL SUMMARY 
Plaintiff, Deer Valley Unified School Dis-
trict ("Deer Valley"), is located in northern 
Maricopa County. Due to a dramatic rise 
in elementary school student enrollments in 
the eastern portion of their district, Deer 
Valley officials investigated possible sites 
for a n£w school in that area. They finally 
located a suitable fifteen-acre parcel owned 
by the state school trust. Deer Valley 
contacted the Arizona State Land Depart-
ment fthe "Department") to see if the dis-
trict could obtain the land. Howe,ver, the 
Department preferred to hold the property 
in the hope of obtaining a higher yield for 
the state school trust through future com-
mercial leases. The Department refused to 
hold a public auction and allow Deer Valley 
$Xi opportunity to buy the property. 
an 
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When further negotiations proved fruit-
less, Deer Valley filed an action seeking to 
condemn the proposed school*site. The 
action was brought under the eminent do-
main provisions of A.R.S. §§ 12-1111 et 
seq. In its complaint, Deer Valley also 
sought an interlocutory order allowing it to 
take immediate possession of the property 
upon the deposit of money or the posting of 
a bond. A.R.S. § 12-1116. The trial court 
issued an order requiring the Department 
to show cause why Deer Valley should not 
take immediate possession of the property. 
See A.R.S. § 12-1116. When the Depart-
ment moved to dismiss the complaint, the 
trial court vacated the show cause hearing 
and granted the dismissal motion. 
The trial court dismissed the complaint 
on the grounds that the proposed condem-
nation violated § 28 of the Arizona-New 
Mexico Enabling Act, Act of June 20,1910, 
Pub.L. No. 219 (ch. 310), 36 Stat. 557 (the 
"Enabling Act") and its rescript in Ariz. 
Const art 10. Those provisions prohibit 
the sale of state school trust lands for less 
than the appraised true value to the high-
est and best bidder at a duly advertised 
public auction. The trial court concluded 
that these rules applied in full to acquisi-
tions by eminent domain, effectively pre-
venting the condemnation of school trust 
land. The court concluded also that con-
demnation would deprive the Department 
of the opportunity to obtain a price higher 
than the appraised value, hinder the De-
partment's obligation to manage and max-
imize the trust benefits and give Deer Val-
ley trust benefits to the detriment of other 
beneficiaries. Finally, the court ruled that 
the school trust land did not belong to the 
state and was therefore not subject to con-
demnation under A.R.S. § 12-1114. The 
court held, therefore, that neither the state 
nor its subdivisions could condemn land 
held in the school trust. 
Deer Valley filed a timely notice of ap-
peal and sought special action relief * in the 
court of appeals. The court of appeals 
stayed the appeal pending resolution of the 
special action. After briefing and oral ar-
1. In Arizona, relief formerly obtained by writs 
of prohibition, mandamus or certiorari is now 
obtained by "special action." Rule 1, Arizona 
gument, on July 23, 1986 the court of ap-
peals declined to accept special action juris-
diction without comment as to the merits of 
the case. The appeal itself became at issue 
in the court of appeals on September 30, 
1986. Deer Valley sought relief from this 
court either by review of the denial of 
special action jurisdiction or by transfer of 
the appeal. We denied special action re-
view, but ordered transfer of the appeal to 
this court. Rule 19, Ariz.R.Civ.App.P., 17A 
A.R.S. 
DISCUSSION 
The central issue in this case is whether 
either the Enabling Act or the Arizona 
Constitution allows Deer Valley to con-
demn state school trust land. 
A. The State School Trust Lands 
As Arizona approached statehood in 
1910, Congress proposed to transfer mil-
lions of acres of federal land directly to the 
new state for the support of its common 
schools. Enabling Act § 24. Congress 
had made similar grants to other states 
with untoward results. Some states im-
providently leased and sold their lands with 
little or no benefit to the public schools. 
See Murphy v. State, 65 Ariz. 338, 351,181 
P.2d 336, 344 (1947). As a result, when 
Congress agreed to give the land to Arizo-
na, it required Arizona to accept and hold 
the land in trust and prohibited the sale or 
other disposal of such trust land except 
under extremely restrictive and detailed 
conditions. See Kadish v. Arizona State 
Land Department, 155 Ariz. 484, 487, 747 
P.2d 1183, 1186 (1987). 
The members of Arizona's constitutional 
convention fully appreciated the value of 
the proposed school grant. The delegates 
therefore drafted an unambiguous clause 
accepting the gift and restrictions of the 
Enabling Act 
The State of Arizona and its people 
hereby consent to all and singular the 
provisions of the Enabling Act . . . con-
Rules of Procedure for Special Actions, 17A 
AILS. 
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cerning the lands thereby granted or con-
firmed to the State, the terms and condi-
tions upon which said grants and confir-
mations are made, and the means and 
manner of enforcing such terms and con-
ditions, all in every respect and particu-
lar as in the aforesaid Enabling Act pro-
vided. 
Ariz. Const, art. 20, 1112. 
The framers of our constitution, how-
ever, went beyond mere acceptance of the 
terms and benefits of a federal statute. 
They independently replicated the essential 
restrictions of the Enabling Act in Article 
10 of the Arizona Constitution. In a spe-
cial direct election held February 8, 1911, 
the people of Arizona approved their con-
vention's constitution by a vote of 12,187 to 
3,822. Constitution Ratification, Phoenix 
Arizona Republican, Feb. 10, 1911, at 1, col. 
3; Canvass of the Returns, Phoenix Arizo-
na Republican, Feb. 28,1911, at 1, col. 1, 2. 
When Arizona ultimately attained state-
hood on February 14, 1912, the constitu-
tional conditions and limits on the manage-
ment and disposal of the state school trust 
lands became part of Arizona's "fundamen-
tal law." Union Oil Co. of Arizona v. 
Norton-Morgan Commercial Co., 23 Ariz. 
236, 241, 202 P. 1077, 1079 (1922). 
Congress has periodically amended the 
Enabling Act to allow Arizona more flexi-
ble use of its school trust land. See, e.g., 
Act of June 5, 1936, Pub.L. No. 658 (ch. 
517), 49 Stat 1477; Act of June 2, 1951, 
Pub.L. No. 44 (ch. 120), 65 Stat. 50. These 
amendments were normally the result of 
specific requests for change channeled 
through Arizona's congressional delega-
tion. See, e.g., S.Rep. No. 1939, 74th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); H.R.Rep. No. 2615, 
74th Cong., 2d Sess. (1936); S.Rep. No. 194, 
82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); H.R.Rep. No. 
429, 82d Cong., 1st Sess. (1951); 97 Cong. 
Rec. 362&-29, 5731-32 (1951) (floor de-
bates). 
In each case, the Arizona electorate vot-
ed to change the Arizona Constitution to 
take advantage of the prior revision in the 
federal statutory law. See, e.g., 1940 Ariz. 
Sess.Laws, Initiative and Referendum Mea-
sures, at 392-93 (amending Ariz. Const. 
art. 10, § 3); 1951 Ariz.Sess.Laws, Initia-
tive and Referendum Measures, at 483-85 
(same). See also Boice v. Campbell, 30 
Ariz. 424, 428, 248 P. 34, 35 (1926). 
Thus, at all times since Arizona joined 
the Union, there havfc been two complemen-
tary levels of protection against improvi-
dent state legislative or executive disposal 
of Arizona's school tifust land. The disposi-
tive issue in the present case is whether 
either the Enabling; Act or the Arizona 
Constitution allows a state school district 
to condemn a tract of Arizona's school 
trust land. 
B. The Enabling A<k 
[1] The Enabling Act is a federal law. 
It provides a minimum guarantee for the 
integrity of state school trust land. Like 
the analogous provisions in the Arizona 
Constitution, § 28 of the Enabling Act os-
tensibly requires that the state only sell or 
dispose of school trust land at a duly adver-
tised public auction following appraisal. 
However, the United States Supreme Court 
has declined to give effect to the literal 
protections of the Enabling Act. 
The United States Supreme Court con-
firmed an emphatic incursion on the explic-
it language of the Enabling Act in Lassen 
v. Arizona ex rel. Arizona Highway De-
partment, 385 U.S. 4^8, 87 S.Ct. 584, 17 
L.Ed.2d 515 (1967). In ihat case, in accord-
ance with the plain terins of the Enabling 
Act, the state land department attempted 
to force the state and County highway de-
partments to pay for material sites and 
easements on state school trust land. This 
would have curtailed a fifty-year practice 
to the contrary. The st^te highway depart-
ment successfully challenged this change 
by judicial action. The Arizona Supreme 
Court affirmed, reasoning that the ease-
ments and material sites did no damage to 
trust land and actually created an overall 
benefit to the trust and to the state. State 
v. Lassen, 99 Ariz. 161, 4^ )7 P.2d 747 (1965). 
Thus, the Court held that the state could 
acquire highway easements across school 
trust land without payment Id. The state 
land department then appealed to the Unit-
ed States Supreme Court. 
ii? 
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On appeal, the United States Supreme 
Court first noted our view that the En-
abling Act restrictions were inapplicable to 
state acquisitions of less than a fee interest 
and stated that this "contention [was] 
plainly foreclosed" by the language of the 
act which expressly applies to "[e]very 
sale, lease, conveyance or contract." Las-
sen, 385 U.S. at 462 n. 6, 87 S.Ct. at 586 n. 
6. The Court held, further, that Congress 
had intended to ensure full compensation to 
the trust fund from any use or disposal of 
the trust land. Id. at 463, 87 S.Ct at 587. 
Therefore, the state was required to pay 
"full compensation"—appraised value— 
"for the land it uses." Id. at 465, 87 S.Ct 
at 588. 
Although it took a strict view of the full 
compensation provision of the Enabling 
Act, the Court declined to literally construe 
the public notice, public auction and high 
bid provisions of the same Act Reasoning 
that the latter restrictions were intended to 
guarantee only that the trust fund would 
receive "appropriate compensation for 
trust lands," the Court concluded that it 
was unnecessary to impose such conditions 
"on transfers in which the abuses they 
were intended to prevent are not likely to 
occur." Id. at 464, 87 S.Ct at 587. The 
Court held, therefore, that "Arizona need 
not offer public notice or conduct a public 
sale" on acquisitions of trust lands by the 
state highway department Id. at 465, 87 
S.Ct at 588. The Court's holding on this 
point was reinforced by its belief that the 
public notice/public sale provisions of the 
Enabling Act were useless in an acquisition 
by a state agency because the state eventu-
ally could condemn the land in any event 
Id. at 464, 87 S.Ct at 587. 
The conclusion to be drawn from Lassen, 
of course, is that the federal act allows a 
state agency to acquire an interest in 
school trust land by either negotiation or 
condemnation. On any such acquisition, 
the agency must pay appraised value, but 
need not comply with the express language 
of the Enabling Act requiring public notice 
and public auction. If all that were in-
volved in the present case was the interpre-
tation of federal law, the Lassen interpre-
tation of the Enabling Act would be bind-
ing precedent However, we must answer 
to another authority-i-the Arizona Consti-
tution. 
C. The Arizona Constitution 
[2] When Arizona accepted the school 
trust land from Congress, the people of our 
state agreed to hold and dispose of this 
valuable asset only as provided in the En-
abling Act and in the state constitution, 
and only for the educational goals outlined 
in the grant Ariz.l Const, art. 10, § 1. 
Our state charter plainly says that the 
state may not sell, lease or otherwise dis-
pose of school trust land other than to the 
highest and best bidder at a duly adver-
tised public auction. Ariz. Const art. 10, 
§§ 3-4. In no event may the state transfer 
the land for less than its appraised value. 
Id. 
Condemnation of state school trust land 
ensures that the school trust will at least 
receive the judicially) verified appraised val-
ue of the condemned! land. See, e.g., In re 
Condemnation of Lands in St Louis 
County, 124 Minn.|271, 277-78, 144 N.W. 
960, 962 (1914). However, the exercise of 
eminent domain does not allow the addi-
tional profit to the trust which may come 
from competitive bidding at an advertised 
public auction. Gladden Farms, Inc. v. 
State, 129 Ariz. 51^, 520, 633 P.2d 325, 329 
(1981). This is particularly true in the vi-
cinity of our perpetually expanding urban 
areas, where the most expert appraisal 
might underestimate the true demand for 
an undeveloped barcel of real estate. 
Therefore, wise puplic policy encourages us 
to adhere to the ^alutary protections con-
tained in our state charter. 
Of course, eveiji if we questioned the 
continuing wisdod of the trust restrictions 
enumerated in our constitution, we are obli-
gated to implement them. Gladden 
Farms, 129 Ariz, at 521, 633 P.2d at 330. 
See also Stillma\i v. Marston, 107 Ariz. 
208, 209, 484 P.$d 628, 629 (1971). We 
have no right to delete terms from the 
plain language of its text See, e.g., Bo-
hannan v. Corporation Commission, 82 
Ariz. 299, 302, 813 P.2d 379, 381 (1957). 
The Arizona Constitution clearly describes 
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public auction as the proper method of 
disposal of our school trust land. Gladden 
Farms, supra. We cannot permit dispos-
als that do not fit within the scope of the 
enumerated methods. Id.; Morris v. Ari-
zona Corporation Commission, 2A Ariz. 
App. 454, 456, 539 P.2d 928, 930 (1975). 
Lassen holds that condemnation is a per-
missible method of disposal. With all due 
respect for the views the United States 
Supreme Court expressed in Lassen, we 
decline to follow that case in interpreting 
the identical language in the Arizona Con-
stitution. We make this decision as a mat-
ter of state law on independent state 
grounds. See Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 
1032, 1037-44, 103 S.Ct. 3469, 3474-78, 77 
L.Ed.2d 1201 (1983). Although we fully 
understand the reasoning of the Supreme 
Court, we firmly believe that we may not 
ignore the express words contained in the 
Arizona Constitution. Our constitution re-
quires public notice, public auction and sale 
to the highest and best bidder. The words 
are plain and specific, and accomplish prac-
tical goals that the Lassen rule overlooks. 
The Enabling Act, as interpreted in Lassen, 
merely sets out the minimum protection for 
our state trust land. We independently 
conclude that our state constitution does 
much more. Our view does create some 
divergence between state and federal inter-
pretations of substantially identical provi-
sions of organic laws: 
We acknowledge that uniformity is desir-
able. However, the concept of federal-
ism assumes the power, and duty, of 
independence in interpreting our own or-
ganic law. With all deference, therefore, 
we cannot and should not follow federal 
precedent blindly. 
Pool v. Superior Court, 139 Ariz. 98, 108, 
677 P.2d 261, 271 (1984). See also Feldman 
& Abney, The Double Security of Federal-
ism, 20 ARIZ.ST.LJ. 1, 4 (1988). 
CONCLUSION 
We conclude that the state may not dis-
pose of its school trust lands other than by 
2. Because of our disposition of this matter on 
constitutional grounds, we do not reach the 
question whether a school district might statuto-
compliance wi^ h the specific terms and con-
ditions of the Arizona Constitution.2 Con-
demnation do^s not fit within Arizona's 
constitutional framework, nor does it guar-
antee the highest possible return for the 
trust. We therefore affirm the trial 
court's dismissal of this action. 
GORDON, <pJ., and CAMERON and 
HOLOHAN, JLJ., concur. 
MOELLER, J., did not participate in 
the determination of this matter. 
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STATE of Arizona, Through the CRIMI-
NAL DIVISION OF the ATTORNEY 
GENERALS OFFICE, Petitioner, 
v. 
SUPERIOR COURT of the State of Arizo-
na, In and For the COUNTY OF MARI-
COPA, Honorable Daniel E. Nastro, a 
Judge thereof, Respondent Judge, 
Elden GARDNER, Real Party 
in Interest. 
No. CV-87-0111-PR. 
Supretne Court of Arizona, 
En Banc. 
July 19, 1988. 
Reconsideration Denied Sept. 20, 1988. 
Caucasian criminal defendant objected 
to prosecutor's use of peremptory chal-
lenges to strike black veniremen. The Su-
perior Court, Maricopa County, Cause No. 
CR-155598, Daniel E. Nastro, J., required 
prosecutor to disclose reasons for exercis-
ing peremptory challenges, and State 
sought special action relief. The Court of 
Appeals, Jac^bson, J., 753 P.2d 1168, de-
nied relief, ahd State sought review. The 
rily condemn non-trust state land in appropriate 
circumstances. 
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Van Wagoner v. Whitmore, 58 Utah 418 
N o r is there a n y m e r i t in the content ion that the C o m m i s -
s ion fa i l ed t o m a k e c e r t a i n specific findings. T h e r e i s 
n o t h i n g in o u r s t a t u t e r e q u i r i n g the Commiss ion to 8 
make specific findings. W h i l e it shou ld make findings 
u p o n all u l t i m a t e q u e s t i o n s of fact , y e t it is no t requ ired to 
do so. W e h a v e n o d o u b t that , in case it were r e q u e s t e d b y 
e i ther p a r t y to m a k e specif ic findings, it would , h o w e v e r , d o so . 
I n v i e w of w h a t h a s b e e n sa id it fo l lows that th i s proceed-
i n g s h o u l d be d i s m i s s e d , a n d the a w a r d of the C o m m i s s i o n 
s h o u l d be, a n d it a c c o r d i n g l y is, affirmed. 
C O R F M A N , C. J . , a n d W E B E R , G I D E O N , a n d T H U R -
M A N , J J . , c o n c u r . 
V A N W A G O N E R v . W I H T M O R E et al. ( S T A T E , b y 
S T A T E B O A R D O F L A N D C O M M I S S I O N E R S , 
I n t e r v e n e r ) . 
No. 3613. Decided May 9, 1921. Rehearing Denied July 15, 1921. 
(199 Pac. 670.) 
1. ADVERSE POSSESSION—PLAINTIFF HAD BURDEN OF SHOWING WHY 
STATUTES OF LIMITATION PLEADED »Y DEFENDANTS WERE INAP-
PLICABLE. In ejectment, in which the defendants claimed title 
by adverse possession under Comp. Laws 1917, $$ 6446, 6447, 
6449, 6450, the plaintiff had the burden of showing why such 
statutes did not apply. 
2. EVIDENCE:—JUDICIAL NOTICE TAKEN THAT STATE LAND IS NOT 
TAXED. The court will take judicial notice of the fact land was 
not taxed as long a s the title remained in the state. 
3. ADVERSE POSSESSION—NOT APPLICAHLE TO LANDS GRANTED BY 
UNITED STATES TO STATE FOR COMMON SCHOOLS. Title to land 
granted to the state by the Enabling Act (Act Cong. July 16, 
1894), for the support of the common schools in the state, 
cannot be acquired by adverse possession as against the state 
under Comp. Laws 1917, g§ 6446, 6447, 6449, 6450, in view of 
section 10 of the Enabling Act, and in view of Const, art. 10, 
§ 3, art. 20, § 1, though the state sold the land under section 
19211 SUPREME COURT OP UTAH 419 
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5575, such statutes of limitation having no application to land 
granted by Congress for the support of common schools.* 
4. EJECTMENT—COUNTERCLAIM FOR IMPROVEMENTS HELD INSUFFI-
CIENT. In ejectment against defendants, who had been in pos-
session while the land belonged to the state, counterclaim for 
value of improvements placed on land by defendants, under 
Occupying Claimant Statute (Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 5031-5038), 
held insufficient, in that it failed to show that defendants' pos-
session was under color of title in good faith, under section 
5035, or under state land laws administered by state board of 
land commissioners. 
5. EJECTMENT—MEASURE OF DAMAGES FOR DETENTION STATED. In 
ejectment a measure of damages against defendant for deten-
tion of property is the rental value of the land in the condition 
it was in during the period for which damages are claimed. 
6. APPEAL AND ERROR—FINDINGS ON CONFLICTING EVIDENCE NOT 
REVIEWED. Appellate court will not review findings on conflict-
ing evidence though its own views as to the weight of the evi-
dence might not agree with those of the trial court. 
7. EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS—STATUTES RELATING TO CLAIMS 
HELD INAPPLICABLE TO CLAIMS FOR DAMAGES FOR DETENTION OF 
LAND. Comp. Laws 1917, §§ 7648, 7657, relating to claims against 
the estate of deceased arising upon contracts, held inapplicable 
to a claim for damages for detention of land, such statutes 
having no reference to claims for damages arising from tor-
tious acts. 
On Rehearing. 
8. APPEAL AND ERROR—JUDGMENT ON FINDINGS SUSTAINED BY SUB-
STANTIAL EVIDENCE AFFIRMED. If there is any substantial evi-
dence to sustain the findings, the judgment should be affirmed. 
9. EVIDENCE—COURT WILL NOT T A K E JUDICIAL KNOWLEDGE AS TO 
PRODUCTION OR COST OF HARVESTING, ETC., OF LUCERN. The Su-
preme Court will not take judicial notice that land will not 
produce two tons of lucern per acre without irrigation, or that 
market value of lucern would not be $15 per ton, or that the 
cost of harvesting, bailing, and preparing it for market would 
exceed $5 per ton. 
» Pioneer Investment and Trust Co. v. Board of Education, 35 
Utah, 1, 99 P. 150, 136 Am. St. Rep. 1016. 
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Appeal from District Court, Seventh District, Carbon 
County; Geo. Christenscn, Judge. 
Action by A. D. Van Wagoner against J. W. Whitmore, 
administrator of the estate of George C. Whitmore, deceased 
and another in which the State of Utah, by its State Board 
of Land Commissioners, intervened. Judgment for plaintiff, 
and defendants appeal. 
AFFIRMED. 
A. R. Barnes and D. N. Straup, both of Salt Lake City, 
for appellants. 
Ferdinand Erichsen and Thos. L. Mitchell, both of Salt 
Lake City, and M. P. Braffet, of Price, for respondent. 
Harvey Cluff, Atty. Gen., and JlerhcrV E. Smyth, of Salt 
Lake City, for intervener. 
THURMAN, J. 
This is an action in ejectment to recover possession of a 
part of section 2, township 15~sbiithf of rarigeT^east, of theT 
Salt Lake base and meridian, situated in Carbon county, 
Utah, and damages for detention of the property. 
The action was originally commenced against George C. 
Whitmore and Peter C. Jones. The answer of these defend-
ants disclosed the fact that Whitmore claimed ownership of 
the property by adverse possession, and that Jones was Whit-
more's agent merely, and claimed no other interest. 
The quantity of land claimed by Whitmore is 56.68 acres. 
By their amended answer defendants rely on certain statutes 
of limitation as the same are found in the Compiled Laws of 
Utah 1907, in force when the action was commenced. These 
statutes now appear in Comp. Laws Utah 1917 as sections 
6446, 6447, 6449, and 6450. 
The state of Utah, by its Board of Land Commissioners 
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(hereinafter called Board), having sold the land in contro-
versy to plaintiff in accordance with proceedings had under 
the statutes relating to the disposal of state lands, conceived 
the idea that the state was an interested party and should 
be permitted to intervene. The intervention was allowed, 
and a complaint in intervention filed by the Board. 
The pleadings are prolix, but the issues free from complica-
tions. 
Without attempting to state in detail the various allega-
tions of the pleadings, or even the substance thereof, in this 
connection it is sufficient to state that the plaintiff claims 
title under a patent from the state issued by the Board. J. 
W. Whitmore, as administrator, successor to George C. Whit-
more, who died after the action was commenced, claims title 
by adverse possession under the statutes above referred to, 
while the state, as intervener, in defense of plaintiff's title, 
contends that the statutes of limitations relied on by defend-
ants have no application to the case. 
The complaint in intervention sets out in minute detail 
various grounds upon which the state challenges the validity 
of the defense interposed by the defendants. The grounds, 
relied on by the Board, and the reply thereto, as far as the 
same are material, will appear later on in our discussion of 
the questions involved. 
After the substitution of J. W. Whitmore, administrator, 
as defendant, he was permitted by the trial court to amend 
his answer and file a counterclaim for the value of the im-
provements placed on the land by his intestate in the event 
that it should be adjudged that plaintiff is entitled to the 
property. The court to whom the case was tried without a 
jury found the issues in favor of the plaintiff, both for the 
possession of the land and damages for its detention, and re-
fused to allow the value of the improvements claimed by the 
defendants in the counterclaim. 
Judgment was accordingly entered for plaintiff, and de-
fendants appeal. Many errors are assigned, and the same 
will be considered as far as necessary to the determination 
of the questions involved. 
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While the question of damages claimed by respondent and 
the value of the improvements claimed by appellant Whit-
more, in the event that respondent, Van Wagoner, is ad-
judged to be entitled to the property, are questions that must 
be determined, it is conceded by all parties to the action that 
the controlling and overshadowing question is, Are the lands 
in controversy subject to the statutes of limitations relied on 
by appellants and can title thereto be acquired by adverse 
possession! If these questions must be answered in the af-
firmative, the judgment of the trial court should be reversed; 
if answered in the negative, then questions relating to re-
spondent's damages and value of improvements claimed by 
appellants must be determined. 
As the statutes of limitation specifically pleaded and relied 
on by appellants constitute the foundation of their defense 
to respondent's action, they are deemed of sufficient import-
ance in this connection to quote at length for the convenience 
of the reader. The quotations are made from the Compiled 
Laws of Utah 1917: 
"6446. The state will not sue any person for or in respect to 
any real property, or the issues or profits thereof, hy reason of the 
right or title * * * to the same, unless: 
"1. Such right or title shall have accrued within seven years 
hefore any action or^other proceedHng for the same shall be com-
menced; or, 
"2. The state or those from whom it claims shall have received 
the rents and profits of such real property, or some part thereof, 
within seven years. 
"6447. No action can be brought for or in respect to real prop-
erty by any person claiming under letters patent or grants from 
this state, unless the same might have been commenced by the 
state as herein specified, in case such patent had not been issued or 
grant made/' 
"6449. No action for the recovery of real property, or for the 
possession thereof, shall be maintained, unless it appear that the 
plaintiff, his ancestor, grantor, or predecessor was seized or pos-
sessed of the property in question within seven years, before the 
commencement of the action. 
"6450. No cause of action, or defense or counterclaim to an 
action, founded upon the title to real property or to rents or profits 
out of the same, shall be effectual unless it appears that the person 
prosecuting the action, or interposing the defense or counterclaim, 
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or under whose title the action is prosecuted or defense or counter-
claim is made, or the ancestor, predecessor, or grantor of such 
person was seized or possessed of the property in question within 
seven years before the committing of the act in respect to which 
such action is prosecuted or defense or counterclaim made." 
It is an undisputed fact that George C. Whitmore was in 
the open and notorious oeeupancy and possession of the land 
in question ever since long hefore Utah was admitted into 
the Union. It is also undisputed that he inclosed the land 
with a fence, made other improvements thereon, such as the 
construction of water ditches, and that he cultivated the land 
and produced crops thereon from year to year. TJiere were 
all the outward appearances of an adverse holding by him 
under claim of right, except the payment of taxes on the land, 
and, as to those, none were levied or assessed/\ Whether or 
not it was his duty to pay taxes in any event, whether the 
land was assessed or not, in order to establish a title by ad-
verse possession presents a question of law which may or may 
not be necessary to determine in the case at bar, and as io 
whether or not he intended to hold adversely to the state, 
which at the date of its admission into the Union became the 
legal owner of the property, does not appear, but for the pur-
poses of the discussion the fact may be admitted. With these 
outward af>p^arance5_^iulJndications undisputed, and the 
other facts assumed, it would seem that the sections of the 
statute relied on afford a complete bar to respondents action 
in the present case; that is to say, taking the outward ap-
pearances above referred to, and assuming that the payment 
of taxes was not required, and that the intention of Whit-
more was to hold adversely and not in subordination to the 
state, the conditions seem to favor the contention of appel-
lants that respondent's right of action was barred when the 
suit was commenced. 
However, inasmuch as the class of land to which the land 
in controversy belongs was granted to the state of Utah by 
act of Congress July 16, 1894, commonly known as the En-
abling Act, for the support of common schools in the state, 
respondents contend that the statutes of limitation do not 
apply. Their position is best stated in the words of their own 
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counsel as the same appear in their printed brief filed in the 
case : 
"Now, we do not contend that the state of Utah has not con-
sented to a bar against the state in some matters, but we do 
contend that the lands involved in this controversy, being school 
lands, are not within the class of property as to which the state has 
consented to be barred, or consented to any title being acquired 
by adverse possession. At first blush, section 6446 et seq. might 
seem to justify an assumption that the state is barred as to all 
real property, but we contend that the nature and purpose of the 
school grant from the United States, the wording and spirit of the 
acceptance of the grant in the state Constitution, tbe legislative 
provisions to carry out and utilize the grant for the purpose for 
which it was granted, the necessary incidents of this trust, and 
the beneficent result of a faithful performance of the trust, are 
such that to permit a construction of said sections 6446 et seq., 
taking away the substance of the grant, despoiling the school fund, 
would be an utter violation of the terms of the trust imposed by tbe 
donor and of the Bolemn conditions specified in the acceptance of 
the grant." 
Counsel for respondents then quote from section 6 of the 
Enabling Act (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, p. 30 ) , the following 
language: 
"That upon the admission of said state into the Union, sections 
numbered two, sixteen, thirty-two and thirty-six in every township 
* • * are hereby granted to said state tor the support ot common 
schools." 
In the same connection they also call attention of the court 
to section 10 of the same act, which, as far as material here, 
reads: 
"That the proceeds of lands herein granted for educational pur-
poses, except as hereinafter otherwise provided, shall constitute 
a permanent school fund, the interest of which only shall be ex-
pended for the support ot said schools." 
Furthermore, counsel for respondents call the attention of 
the court to the following provisions of the state Constitution 
made in pursuance of the Enabling Act: 
"Article XX. Section 1. All lands of the state that have been, 
or may hereafter be granted to the state by Congress, and yll lands 
acquired by gift, grant or devise, from any person or corporation, 
or that may otherwise be acquired, are hereby accepted and de-
clared to be the public lands of the state; and shall be held in trust 
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for the people, to be disposed of as map be provided by law, for the 
respective purposes for which they have been or may be pranted, 
donated, devised or otherwise acquired.'1 (Italics ours.) 
Article 10, § 3, provides that the proceeds of the sale of 
state lands and other lands granted for the support of com-
mon schools shall be and remain a perpetual fund, the inter-
est only to be used. Section 5 of the same article is, substan-
tially, to the same effect, while section 7 provides that "al l 
public school funds shall be guaranteed by the state against 
loss or d ivers ion/ ' 
From all of these provisions of the Enabling Act and state 
Constitution counsel conclude that the sections of the statutes 
relied on by appellants are repugnant to, and in conflict with, 
the very spirit of the Enabling Act and state Constitution, 
and therefore have no application to a case involving lands 
granted by Congress for the support of common schools. 
We have purposely indulged in considerable detail in stat-
ing respondents' position and the basis for their con-
tention for the reason that, in view of the statutes 1 
quoted upon which appellants rely, it seems to the 
court that the burden rests upon the respondents to show why 
the statutes pleaded by appellants do not apply in the pres-
ent case. 
I k » s p o m l e n 4 s ^ l s o ^ e l y ^ i i ^ e ^ eases, some-
what analogous, reference to which will be made later dn. 
No serious contention is made by appellants that the steps 
taken by the Board in disposing of the land in question were 
not taken in strict compliance with the provisions of the stat-
ute relating to the disposal of the public lands of the state. 
The general powern of the Board concerning these lands are 
defined in Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 5575, which, in part, 
reads as follows: 
"The Board of Land Commissioners shall have the direction, 
management, and control of all lands heretofore, or which may 
hereafter be, granted to this state by the United States government, 
or otherwise, and to lands lying below the water's edge on any 
lake or stream to the bed of which the state is entitled, for any 
and all purposes whatsoever, except lands used or set apart for 
public purposes or occupied by public buildings, and shall have 
the power to sell or lease the same for the best interests of the 
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state and In accordance with the provisions of this chapter and 
the Constitution of the state." 
A patent to the land in controversy was issued by Ihe state 
to the respondent, Van Wagoner, June 28, 1916. It is eon-
tended by appellants, and the contention is not seriously 
questioned, that as early as 1887 George C. Whitmore en-
tered into possession of this land, fenced it, cullivated it, and 
constructed a water ditch for the purpose of conveying water 
thereto, and from that time on was continuously in possession 
of and claiming said land as his own; that he maintained the 
fence and cultivated and irrigated the land down to the trial 
of this case. It was stipulate^ by counsel for the respective 
parties to this action that from the date of the admis-
sion of Utah into the Union no taxes had ever been 2 
assessed or levied against the land. Without such stip-
ulation this court would undoubtedly take judicial* notice of 
the fact that such land was not taxed as long as the title re-
mained in the state. 
It has been assumed for the purpose of disposing of the 
questions involved in the plea of adverse possession that ap-
pellant Whitmore\s intestate, George C. Whitmore, did every-
thing that was necessary to be done by him to establish title 
by adverse possession if the land in controversy is included 
within the class covered by the statutes upon which appel-
lants rely. If we understand respondents' position, they prac-
tically concede the facts which we have assumed. Relying 
upon the fact that all the elements necessary to constitute 
adverse possession have been established for the full period 
of time required by the statute, appellants insist that the case 
comes within the rules declared in Pioneer Investment & 
Trust Co. v. Board of Education, 35 Utah, 1, 99 Pac. 150, 136 
Am. St. Rep. 1016. In that case it appears the land in ques-
tion had at one time been used by the board of education for 
school purposes, but had long since been abandoned for such 
purposes because more suitable for something else. Conse-
quently it was held for sale whenever a satisfactory price * 
could be obtained. It was sold by the board and the title war-
ranted. Afterwards the title was contested by a corporation, 
claiming title by adverse possession, who refused to surrender 
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the property to the purchaser. The party claiming title 
under the board of education was compelled to expend money 
to quiet his title and brought an action against the board on 
a covenant of warranty to recover the sum so expended. The 
question of title by adverse possession formed the principal 
issue. The fact that the land had been devoted to school pur-
poses and was owned by the board of education in that capac-
ity was pleaded and relied on. The trial court decided the 
issue in favor of the plaintiff, and, on appeal to this court, 
the judgment wras affirmed. 
There are many points of difference between that case and 
the one at bar. It is only necessary to mention two or three: 
(1) The property had long been abandoned for school pur-
poses and held for sale for other purposes when a satisfactory 
price could be obtained; (2) it does not appear that the land 
was, or ever had been, land the title to which was in the state; 
(3) it does not appear that the land was, in any sense, within 
the provisions of the Enabling Act or of the state Constitu-
tion, upon which respondents rely in the instant case, and 
hence it is difficult to see how the case in any manner meets 
the contention made by respondents. Appellants also cite 
and rely on the following cases in support of the proposition 
thitM44le4o^^h^4aH^4^^onlroversyjnay he^flcquired by ad-L 
verse possession: Schneider v. Hutchinson, 35 Or. 253, 57 
Pac. 324, 76 Am. St. Rep. 474; Hamilton v. Fluornoy, 44 Or. 
97, 74 Pac. 483; Ambrose v. Huntington, 34 Or. 484, 56 Pac. 
513; State v. Schmidt, 180 Ala. 374, 61 South. 293; State v. 
Schmidt, 232 U. S. 168, 34 Sup. Ct. 301, 58 L. Ed. 555; Mil-
ler v. Stale, 38 Ala. 600; People v. Banning Co., 167 Cal. 
643, 140 Pac. 587; Redwood County v. Winona, 40 Minn. 512, 
42 N. W. 473; School Directors v. Georges, 50 Mo. 194; Burch 
v. Winston, 57 Mo. 62; Whitley County Land Co. v. Powers, 
146 Ky. 801, 144 S. W. 2 ; Wright v. Phipps (C. C.) 90 Fed. 
556; Id. 98 Fed. 1007, 38 C. C. A. 702; Bullard v. Hollings-
worth, 110 N. C. 634, 53 S. K. 441. It would be impossible, 
within reasonable limits, to carefully review and distinguish 
all of these cases. We shall endeavor, however, to give care-
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ful attention to such as appear to be in any sense analogous 
to the present case. 
In Schneider, v. Hutchinson, supra, the action was to re-
cover possession of certain land granted by Congress to the 
state of Oregon for the /Use of schools. The evidence dis-
closed the fact that the land had been occupied, possessed, 
and adversely held by the defendant and others for a period 
of more than 20 years. While the land was so possessed and 
occupied the board of commissioners for the sale of school 
lands sold and conveyed the land to the plaintiff's grantor. 
The court held that the action was barred by the statute of 
limitations and entered judgment accordingly. The appel-
late court affirmed the judgment. Much of the reasoning of 
the court in its opinion consists of a dissertation upon the fact 
that the statute of limitations involved in the case, which 
barred the action after a lapse of 10 years, applied to lands 
which the state held in its governmental as well as in its pro-
prietary capacity, a doctrine which, in our opinion, is against 
the weight of authority. While in that case it appears that 
the land was granted by Congress to the state for the use of 
schools, it docs not appear that Congress, by the same act, or 
at all, declared, as in the grant to the state of Utah, that the 
proceeds oT the land granted should be and constitute a per-
manent school fund, the interest of which only should be ex-
pended for the support of schools. Neither does it appear 
that the state expressly accepted the lands in trust for the 
people with the solemn declaration that they should be dis-
posed of as provided by law for the purposes for which they 
had been granted, or that the state guaranteed the fund aris-
ing from the sale thereof against loss or diversion. In short, 
no such provisions and restrictions as those existing in the 
Utah Enabling Act and Constitution are found in the Enabl-
ing Act and Constitution of the state of Oregon, or, if such 
provisions do exist, they were not invoked in the Oregon case 
now under review. 
Hamilton v. Fluornoy and Ambrose v. Huntington, supra, 
also Oregon cases, seem to have no bearing upon the question 
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presented here. They are not commented on by appellants' 
counsel or specially relied on. 
The next case in the order of discussion is State v. Schmidt, 
180 Ala. 374, 61 South. 293. TJie case was an action in eject-
ment brought by the state of Alabama to recover possession 
of certain school lands. The case was heard in the trial court 
upon an agreed statement of facts. The question was whether 
the sixteenth section of school lands in the state of Alabama 
was within the statute permitting title to be acquired by ad-
verse possession under color of title. The trial court entered 
judgment for defendant, and the state appealed to the state 
Supreme Court, which affirmed the judgment. What is 
meant in the stipulation by "color of t i t le ' ' does not appear. 
We shall, however, consider the ease as if that term had been 
omitted. The grant by Congress of the sixteenth section of 
every township for the use of schools was, in substance, the 
same as the provision contained in section 6 of the Utah En-
abling Act, heretofore quoted, except that the grant was made 
to the inhabitants of the township instead of to the state. 
That distinction, however, is immaterial inasmuch as the 
court held that, the inhabitants of the township being with-
out legal entity, the legal title vested in the state for the 
benefit of those for whom it was intended. The state accepted 
The grant. T ^ are not 
stated in the opinion. It is stated, however, that " the Consti-
tution of 1819, and its several successors, have pledged the 
good faith of the state in the premises." I t also appears in 
the opinion that the Constitution provided that> such lands 
should be preserved from "waste and damage." As far as 
appeal's in the opinion of the court, the grant by Congress 
did not provide that the fund arising from the proceeds of 
said lands should constitute a permanent school fund the in-
terest of which only should be expended for the support of 
schools; nor is it shown that the Constitution of the state 
guaranteed the proceeds of the land—the funds arising from 
the sale thereof—against loss or diversion. These distinc-
tions, in the judgment of the court, are of vital importance 
in arriving at a correct conclusion. In the Alabama case it 
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seems that Congress manifested no concern whatever as to the 
proceeds of the land or the fund arising from the sale thereof. 
That question it left entirely to the state, while in the case 
of Utah the Enabling Act followed the land down to its very 
proceeds, and declared that they should constitute a perma-
nent fund, the interest of which only should be expended for 
the support of schools. 
The Alabama court in deciding the case appears to have 
been controlled by the principle enunciated in the case of 
Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. 173 (15 L. Ed. 338) , in which the 
court, speaking of grants made to the state for educational 
purposes, at pages 181-182 of the report, says: 
"The trusts created by these compacts relate to a subject cer-
tainly of universal interest, but of municipal concern, over which 
the power of the state is plenary and exclusive. In the present 
instance the grant is to the state directly, without limitation of its 
power, though there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public 
faith." 
The ease was appealed to the Supreme Court of the United 
States in which court the judgment was affirmed. 232 U. S. 
168, 34 Sup. Ct. 301, 58 L. Ed. 555. Being a mere matter of, 
"municipal concern," if the Alabama court had held that the 
state statute of limitations did not apply the federal Supreme 
Ootrrt would, na^loutbt,have^ftirmcd 4he^ judgment ^just the 
same. This much can be said without the slightest reflection 
upon the high character of that distinguished tribunal. While 
we have noticed some distinctions between this case and the 
Alabama case, it by no means follows that we rely upon these 
distinctions alone. We seriously doubt if this court should 
follow the lead of that court on the question presented here, 
even if the distinctions did not exist. It does seem to us that 
where a state accepts a trust concerning land of the nature 
described in the Alabama case, and pledges its faith to an 
execution of the trust, such land, under the "sacred obliga-
tion imposed on its public faith," by reasonable construction 
should be excepted from the operation of ordinary statutes 
of limitation. However, it is neither the province nor in-
clination of this court to criticize or find fault with the courts 
of a sister state in construing statutes relating to the munic-
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ipal concerns of their own state. The decisions of such 
courts, while always persuasive, arc in no sense binding. The 
same may be said concerning decisions in such cases rendered 
on appeal by the highest court in the land, where such de-
cisions simply follow the lead of those rendered in the court 
below, relating to their own "municipal concerns." 
The Oregon case and the Alabama case are the only cases 
relied oti by appellants that in any sense attempt to meet the 
contention made by respondent that the Utah Constitution 
and Enabling Act exclude the idea that title to school lands 
granted by Congress may be acquired by adverse possession. 
We shall therefore not occup'y time and space in reviewing 
the other cases cited by appellants. 
Questions almost identical with the question ^presented here 
have been determined by the courts of last resort of the states 
of Minnesota and Washington adversely to appellants' con-
tention. Mnrtanyh v. C, M. & St. P. Rd. Co., 102 Minn. 52, 
112 N. W. 860, 120 Am. St. Rep. 609; O'Brien v. Wilson, 51 
Wash. 52, 97 Pac. 1115. \ 
It is not necessary to comment on these eases; they speak 
for themselves. In the Minnesota ease the syllabus, consist-
ing of less than three printed lines, reflects the opinion of 
the court. 
--THtte 4e^4an4s^^ranted tojthe^state of Minnesota for the use of 
its schools by the United States cannot be acquTi^a^^l^v^rseiros^ 
session, as against the state." 
At pages 54 and 55 of 102 Minn., at page 861 of 112 N. 
W. (120 Am. St. Ifrp. 609) , the opinion, with greater per-
spicuity than we are capable of, states the whole case: 
"The statute, making statutes of limitations applicable to the 
state, to which reference has been made, must be construed with 
reference to the school land grant and the provisions of the state 
Constitution accepting the grant and providing for the sale of the 
land. Section 18 of an act of Congress entitled 'An act to establish 
the territorial government of Minnesota,' passed March 3, 1849 (9 
St. 408, c. 121), known as the 'Organic Act of Minnesota,' reserved 
sections 16 and 36 of every township for the purpose of being ap-
plied to schools of the territory and future state. This was supple-
mented by section 5 of the act of Congress passed February 26, 1857 
(11 St. 167, c. 60), authorizing the people of Minnesota to form a 
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state government. This section granted to the state sections 16 and 
36 of the public lands In every township within the state for the use 
of schools, provided the grant should be accepted by the constitu-
tional convention, and, if it were, then its terms should become oblig-
atory on the United States and the state of Minnesota. The con-
vention, and the people of the state by their approval and ratifica-
tion of the Constitution, accepted the grant of sections 16 and 36 for 
the use of the schools of the state, and safeguarded the trust by 
providing that the proceeds of such trust lands should remain a 
perpetual school fund, and that no portion of the lands should 
ever be sold otherwise than at public sale. Const. (Minn.) art. 
2, S 3, and article 8, § 2. Our school land grant, then, was not 
made to the state, in its proprietary capacity, but in trust, for 
the explicit purpose of having the lands applied to the use 
of the schools of the state. This was the substantial con-
sideration for the grant which induced the United States to 
make it. The state accepted the trust, and by its Constitution 
solemnly covenanted with the United States to apply the granted 
lands to the sole use of its schools, according to the purpose of the 
grant, and prohibited the sale of any portion of the granted land 
except at public sale. Such being the nature of the title of the state 
to its school land8, It is unthinkable that the Legislature intended 
by section 12, c. 66, O. S. 1866, and later acts amending it, to pro-
vide a way whereby the trust as to any of the school lands might 
be defeated, and title thereto acquired by adverse possession, con-
trary to the mandate of the Constitution that title thereto could only 
be obtained by a public sale thereof." 
The concluding paragraph of the opinion, commencing on 
p a g e W ^ T M M i n i ^ 
Rep. 609) , is equally perspicuous, and expresses the mind of 
the court in terms that cannot be misunderstood: 
"We are, then, of the opinion that, if the statute under consider-
ation must be construed as authorizing the acquisition of title to the 
school lands of the state by adverse possession, it violates in this 
respect, not only the terms of the grant, but also the Constitution of 
the state. We are, however, of the opinion that the statute fairly 
may be given a construction which is consistent with the terms of 
the school land grant and the provisions of the state Constitution 
applicable thereto. If the statute be read in connection with the 
general and well-understood rule of law that title to public land 
cannot be acquired by adverse possession, the history of our school 
land grant, the nature of the title of the state to its school lands, 
and the mandates of our Constitution with reference to them, it is 
clear upon the face of the statute that the Legislature did not intend 
to provide for the acquisition of the title to school lands by adverse 
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possession. We accordingly hold that title "to lands granted to the 
state of Minnesota for the use of its schools by the United States 
cannot be acquired by adverse possession, as against the state." 
Practically every word of that opinion is as applicable to 
the conditions existing here as they were to the case in which 
the opinion was rendered. Counsel for appellants make an 
ingenious attempt to distinguish that case from this because 
the Constitution of Minnesota provides that no portion of 
the lands should ever be sold otherwise than at public sale. 
How abortive this attempt to distinguish the cases must ap-
pear when our attention is called to the fact that the Utah 
Constitution provides that the lands "shall be held in trust 
for Ihc people, to be disposed of as may be provided by law 
for the respective purposes for which they have been or may 
be granted." (Italics ours.) This language is an absolute 
limitation upon the power of the state to dispose of the lands, 
or permit them to be disposed of, except for the purpose for 
which they were granted by Congress. Is it conceivable, in 
the face of such a constitutional provision, that the Legisla-
ture could have intended its statutes of limitation to apply 
to such lands? It is our solemn duty to hold that such could 
not have been the legislative intent. When to the constitu-
tional provision last quoted we add the further provision that 
the state of Utah guarantees the proceeds of these lands 
against loss or diversion, thus nuTTung^tself an tnsurer^and in 
honor bound to make good any loss that the schools might sus-
tain by diverting these lands, or permitting them to be di-
verted, to other purposes, the conclusion becomes irresistible 
that the statutes of limitations have no application to the land 
in question. 
In O'Brien v. Wilson, supra, whioli was also a case in which 
an attempt was made to acquire title, by adverse possession, 
to school lands granted by Congress to the state, the syllabus 
in the Pacific Reporter reads: 
"Ballinger's Ann. Codes & St. § 4807 (Pierce's Code, § 1519), 
making limitations prescribed by the chapter applicable to actions 
by the state, etc., the same as to actions between individuals, does 
not authorize acquisition of title to school lands by adverse pos-
session, since such construction would make the section repugnant 
to Enabling Act (Act Feb. 22, 1889, c. 180, 25 Stat. 679) f 11, and 
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Const, art. 16, § 2, requiring all school lands to be disposed of at 
public sale, etc., and Const, art. 16, § 1, declaring thiit all public 
lands granted to the state shall be held in trust for all the people," 
etc. 
Tn the concluding sentence of its opinion, at page 57 of 51 
Wash., at page 1117 of 97 Pae., the court says: 
"In the language of the Supreme Court of the United States 
\Northern Pac. Hy. Co. v. Toicnscnd, 190 U. S. 267, 23 Sup. Ct. 671, 
47 L. Ed. 1044], 'this being the nature of the title to the land granted 
for the special purposes named, it is evident that to give such efficacy 
to a statute of limitation of a state as would operate to confer a 
permanent right of possession to any proportion thereof upon an 
individual for his private use would be to allow that to be done by 
indirection which could not be done directly'; and to permit title 
to school lands in this state to be acquired indirectly by adverse 
possession would be repugnant to the laws of the United States and 
the Constitution of the state." 
All of which applies to the instant case with equal force 
and effect. 
Counsel for appellant's undertake to distinguish the Wash-
ington case the same as they did the Minnesota case, and our 
answer to the attempt so made must he the same as it was in 
the Minnesota case. The provisions of the Enabling Act and 
the state Constitution are, of themselves, a sufficient answer, 
even if there were no adjudicated cases supporting the views 
herein expressed. 
It is unnecessary to prolong the discussion. The plea of 
the statutes of limitations and the claim of title hy adverse 
possession should not prevail. 
Having reached the conclusion that appellants' plea of ad-
verse possession should not prevail for the reasons 
hereinbefore stated, it is unnecessary to determine the 3 
questions of estoppel and res ad judicata raised hy re-
spondent, or whether it was necessary to pay taxes on the 
land in order to acquire title by adverse possession. 
The remaining questions to he determined relate to appel-
lants' counterclaim for the value of alleged improvements on 
the land, and damages awarded plaintiff for detention of the 
property. These questions will be disposed of in the order 
above stated. 
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The counterclaim was filed April 10, 1918, in which, among 
other things, it is alleged that George C. Whitmore, appel-
lants ' predecessor in interest, entered into possession of the 
land in controversy in 1879 or 1880 in good faith, claiming 
and asserting right and title thereto, and ever since and until 
his death remained in open, notorious, peaceful, uninter-
rupted, visible, and exclusive possession thereof, under color 
of title, and in good faith believing, claiming, and asserting 
that he had a good title thereto, and that he held, possessed, 
occupied, and cultivated said land adversely to plaintiff and 
his predecessor in interest, and made permanent and lasting 
improvements thereon, as follows: Grubbing, clearing, and 
plowing the land, $2,000; leveling, cultivating, and seeding 
the laud, $500; constructing and maintaining a fence upon 
the land, $1,000; constructing and maintaining dams, ditches, 
and canals for the purpose of irrigating the land, $1,000. It 
is then reiterated that his occupancy of the land and im-
provements made thereon were under color of title, and in 
good faith believing that the premises were his own, and ad-
verse to plaintiff and his predecessor in interest. It is fur-
ther alleged that the land without the improvements was of 
the value of $100,000. 
The foregoing constitutes the substance of appellants' 
counterclaim, on the face of which we feel justified in assum-
ing that the pleader had in mind the Occupying Claimant 
Statute (Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §§ 5031 to 5038, inclusive), 
and sought to bring the claim within the provisions of those 
sections. 
Both plaintiff and intervenor filed general and special de-
murrers to the counterclaim, alleging as special grounds, 
among other things, that defendant sought to assert a right 
as an occupying claimant, under the occupying claimant 
statute, without pleading facts sufficient to bring such claim 
within the provisions of said law, in that the counterclaim 
failed to allege that either he or his predecessor in interest 
settled upon or occupied the land claimed for a period of 
three years under or by virtue of any law or contract with 
the proper officers of the state for the purchase thereof, or 
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under any law or by virtue of any purchase from the United 
States. It is also alleged in the demurrer that the counter-
claim is ambiguous in that it cannot be ascertained therefrom 
when the alleged improvements were made, what constituted 
the alleged color of title, or the alleged good faith under 
which the property was occupied or improved, or the facts 
and circumstances upon which appellants' predecessor in in-
terest based his alleged belief that he had a good title to the 
land. I t is also alleged that for the same reason the counter-
claim is unintelligible and also uncertain. 
The demurrer to the counterclaim was sustained. Appel-
lants assign the ruling of the court thereon as error, and call 
our attention to the following cases in support of their con-
tention: Gibson v. Fields, 79 Kan. 38, 1)8 Pac. 1112, 20 L. 
R. A. (N. S.) 378; 131 Am. St. Rep. 278, 17 Ann. Cas. 405; 
Croskery v. Busch, 116 Mich. 288, 74 N. W. 4G4; Devine v. 
Charles, 71 Mo. App. 210; Sherman v. Cook Co., 98 Mich. 61, 
57 N. W. 23; Dietzlcr v. Whilhite, 55 Kan. 200, 40 Pac. 272; 
Hentig v. Redden, 1 Kan. App. 163, 41 Pac. 1054; Hentig v. 
Collins, 1 Kan. App. 173, 41 Pac. 1057. None of the cases 
have any bearing upon the objections raised by the demurrer. 
The demurrer not only makes the point that appellant Whit-
more, in his attempt to claim under the occupying claimant 
statute fails to state facts to Tiring"his claim within tTie pro-
visions of the law, but the demurrer specifically challenges 
the sufficiency of the allegations of the counterclaim respect-
ing good faith and color of title. These objections raised by 
the demurrer are not in any manner discussed by appellants' 
counsel in their brief, nor in the cases upon which they rely. 
In every one of these cases there is something which is gen-
erally recognized by the authorities as constituting color of 
title and something as indicating good faith. Jn the instant 
case, in view of the fact that the improvements for which 
compensation is demanded were made while the title to the 
land was in the government of the United States, with no 
contract for the purchase thereof, how can it be contended 
that appellants' predecessor in interest made the improve-
ments in good faith under color of title believing that he was 
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the owner of the property and had title thereto? Deffeback 
v. Ifawkc,W} U. S. 392, 6 Sup. Ct. 95, 29 L. Ed. 423. This 
question was fairly presented by respondent's demurrer and 
argued in the brief, and, under the circumstances of the case, 
in our opinion was of sufficient importance to call for a re-
sponsive answer. But this is not the strongest objection 
raised by the demurrer. The land in question was land be-
longing to the state. The law, as we understand it, provides 
two remedies in which an occupant of state land, under color 
of title, in good faith, may recover the value of his improve-
ments. One is under the state land laws administered by the 
State Board of Land Commissioners; the other under Comp. 
Laws Utah 1917, § 5035, which is part of the Occupying 
Claimant Law, and reads as follows: 
"When any person has settled upon any real estate, and occupied 
the same for three years under and by virtue of any law or contract 
with the proper officers of the state for the purchase thereof, or 
under any law of, or by virtue of any purchase from the United 
States, and shall have made valuable improvements thereon, and 
shall be found not to be the owner thereof, or not to have acquired 
a right to purchase the same from the state or the United States, 
such person shall be an occupying claimant within the meaning of 
this chapter." 
It will not be contended by appellants that the counter-
claim states a causir~of action tmdet^arry of the laws above 
referred to. 
We are clearly of the opinion that the counterclaim 
docs not state sufficient facts to constitute a cause of 4 
action, and that the demurrer thereto was properly 
sustained. 
The trial court awarded plaintiff damages for the deten-
tion of the property in the sum of $2,280 for the years 1912 
to 1916, inclusive. Appellants insist that the damages are ex-
cessive, and that the judgment therefor is not sustained by 
the evidence. They contend as matter of law that the correct 
measure of damages in this case is the fair rental value of the 
land in its native state without the improvements placed there-
on by appellant Whitmore*s predecessor in interest. In sup-
port of the contention they cite the Kansas cases heretofore re-
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ferred to, and in addition thereto the following: Curry v: 
Sandusky Fish Co., 88 Minn. 485, 93 N. W. 896; ^Irmor v. 
Frey, 253 Mo. 447, 161 S. W. 829; Little Rock v. Jeurycns, 
133 Ark. 126, 202 S. W. 45, and cases cited in notes 53, 19 
C. J . at p. 1242. Most of these cases refer to transactions 
arising under occupying claimant laws for the value of im-
provements, and not to damages for the detention of property 
in ejectment cases. The cases referred to in notes 53, 19 C. 
J., supra, are cited in support of the text, which reads as 
f ollows: 
"Although there Is some authority to the contrary, the rule Is 
that a bona fide occupant holding possession of land under color of 
title is not liable for the increased rental value of the land caused 
by improvements put upon it by himself, but that the rents must be 
computed upon the basis of the condition of the land when defend-
ant took possession." 
It is contended hy respondents that these cases do not ap-
ply to lands the title to which is in the government of the 
United States, and that the alleged improvements upon the 
land in question passed to the state of Utah when it became 
a state in 1896. The following cases relied on by respondents 
appear to be in point: Collins v. Bartlett, 44 Cal. 371; Blair 
v. Worley, 2 111. (1 Scam.) 178; Atiridge v. Billings, 57 111. 
489^ 4 * ^ f c t ^ - * ^ S ^ ^ S e y m o u r v, Watrnn^ 
5 Blackf. (Ind.) 555, 36 Am. Dec. 556; Burlerson v. Teeple, 
2 G. Greene (Iowa) 542. In further support of their con-
tention that the doctrine relied on by appellants does not ap-
ply in the instant case, respondents quote the following ex-
cerpt from the opinion of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Defieback v. Hawke, 115 U. S. 392, 6 Sup. Ct. 95, 
29 L. Ed. 423, heretofore cited in another connection. 
"There can be no color of title in an occupant who does not 
hold under any Instrument, proceeding, or law purporting to trans-
fer to him the title or to give to him the right of possession. And 
there can be no such thing as good faith in an adverse holding, 
where the party knows that he has no title, and that, under the law, 
which he is presumed to know, he can acquire none by his occupa-
tion. Here the defendant knew that the title was in the United 
States, that the lands were mineral, and were claimed as such by 
the plaintiff, and that title to them could be acquired only under 
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the laws providing for the sale of lands of that character; and 
there is no pretense that he ever sought, or contemplated seeking, 
the title to them as such lands, or claimed possession of them under 
any local customs or rules of miners in the district." 
In view of the authorities referred to, and others which we 
have examined, we cannot avoid the conclusion that the meas-
ure of damages in this case was the rental value of the land 
in the condition it was during the period for which 
damages are claimed. Under the facts disclosed by 5 
the record, appellants were not entitled to a reduction 
of the rent on account of the improvements existing on the 
land when Van Wagoner became entitled to possession. 
The water used on the land during the period for which 
damages are claimed was water belonging to George C. Whit-
more and was not appurtenant to the land. The question is, 
what was the rental value of the land, there being no water 
right therefor! In other words, what proportion of the rental 
value of the land, including the water, should be apportioned 
to the land alone? There is substantial competent evidence 
to the effect that the rental value of the land with water was 
from $16 to $21 per acre during the irrigation season, while 
the rental value of the water alone was $5 per acre. A simple 
mathematical computation demonstrates that the rental value 
of the land alone was from $11 to $16 per acre during 
the irrigatiotTlseasoh. The testimony Avasthe^ame^or^ 6 
every year from 1912 to 1916 inclusive. The evidence 
was conflicting, and we are powerless to review the findings, 
even though our own views as to the weight of the evidence 
might not agree with those of the trial court. 
But in respect to the question of damages as against the 
estate of George C. Whitmore, deceased, it is contended by 
appellants that the court erred in overruling their motion 
for nonsuit made when respondents rested their case. The 
motion was interposed on the ground that it appeared in the 
evidence that George C. Whitmore died pending the trial of 
the case, and that no proof was made that claim for damages 
had been presented to the administrator of his estate as pro-
vided in Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §§ 7648 and 7657. These 
sections read as follows: 
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"Sec. 7648. All claims arising upon contracts, whether the same 
be due, not due, or contingent, must be presented within the time 
limited in the notice, and any claim not presented is barred forever; 
provided, that when it is made to appear by the affidavit of the 
claimant, to the satisfaction of the court or judge thereof, that the 
claimant had no notice as provided in this chapter, by reason of 
being out of the state, it may be presented at any time before a 
decree of distribution is entered; provided further, that nothing 
in this title contained shall be so construed as to prohibit the fore-
closure of liens or mortgages as hereinafter provided." 
"Sec. 7657. If an action Is pending against the decedent at the 
time of his death, the plaintiff must in like manner present his 
claim to the executor or administrator for allowance or rejection, 
authenticated as required in other cases; and no recovery shall be 
had in the action unless proof be made of the presentation required." 
The sections quoted are specifically limited to claims 
arising upon contracts, and have no reference to claims 7 
for damages arising from tortious acts. 
In Church's Probate Law and Practice (2d Ed., vol. 2 ) , 
at page 1068, it is said: 
"As the statute which relates to the presentation of claims 
against estates before actions can be commenced thereon relates to 
claims arising upon contracts, other actions do not come within the 
rule. Thus no presentation of a claim is necessary before the bring-
ing of an action to recover damages for a wrongful act." 
See, also, California cases under the statute from which the 
4Jtah^statute was^adopted,—U^r4lm~x^Shi XJlmr^JMx J^aL 
460, 47 Pac. 363; Lcverone v. Weakley, 155 Cal. at page 401, 
101 Pac. 304. 
The motion for nonsuit was properly denied. 
We have carefully considered the various questions pre-
sented on this appeal and find no error in the record. 
The judgment of the trial court is affirmed, at appellant's 
cost. 
CORFMAN, C. J., and W E B E R , GIDEON, and PRICK, 
JJ. , concur. 
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ON Rehearing. 
THURMAN, J. On application for rehearing appellants 
contend that the court erred on the question of title by ad-
verse possession and also as to the question of damages 
awnrded to plaintiff. 
On the first question appellants' brief is exceedingly elab-
orate, and if pertinent to the issues involved would be both 
interesting and instructive. However the argument from be-
ginning to end is based upon a misconception of the principle 
upon which the court decided the case. The court did not 
assume that the grant to the state of the lands in question 
was made upon a condition subsequent or that such grant 
was liable to be defeated by a happening of such condition 
or a failure thereof. No such consideration influenced the 
judgment of the court, nor is any such thought or idea fairly 
deducjblc from the opinion handed down. The court in its 
opinion was influenced largely by the doctrine enunciated in 
Cooper v. Roberts, 18 How. (U. S.) pages 181, 182 (15 L. Ed. 
338) , cited in our opinion and also relied on by appellants, 
wherein the Supreme Court of the United States, in speaking 
of the nature of grants of land by Congress to states for 
sdiooj^purposcs, says: 
"The trusts created by these compacts relaTeT to^  a. Bu^JecT^er-
tainly of universal interest, but of municipal concern, over which 
the power of the state is plenary and exclusive. In the present 
instance the grant is to the state directly, without limitation of its 
power, though there is a sacred obligation imposed on its public 
faith." (Italics supplied.) 
This court in its opinion recognized the fact that there was 
no limitation upon the power of the state, as far as the En-
abling Act is concerned, to dispose of the lands in any man-
ner or for any purpose whatever; that the state Hiould even 
squander the lauds, or give them away to its favorites with-
out consideration, just the same as it could repudiate its just 
obligations and disregard every principle of honor. All this 
was fully understood by the court, which was also fully ad-
vised that no matter what the state did with the lands, or the 
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funds arising- from a disposal thereof, the title would not and 
could not revert to the grantor by virtue of any terms of the 
Enabling Act. But back of all this, the court was also aware, 
as suggested in the excerpt quoted from the opinion in Cooper 
v. Roberts, supra, that there was, by the grant to the state, 
" a sacred obligation imposed upon its public faith" to devote 
the lands in question, or the proceeds arising therefrom, to 
the very purpose for which they were granted by Congress. 
Influenced by these considerations, together with the solemn 
pledges, guarantees, and assurances made by the state Con-
stitution in accepting the grant, this court was compelled to 
determine the question once for all as to whether or not the 
statutes of limitation relied on by appellants apply to the 
lands in dispute. We came to the conclusion the statutes do 
not apply for the reason that such application would be re-
pugnant to both the letter and spirit of the state Constitution, 
the provisions of which we have quoted at length in the opin-
ion. The Constitution declares that such lands "shall be held 
in trust for the people to be disposed of as may be provided 
by law for the respective purposes for which they have been 
or may be granted.'9 We emphasized the language just 
quoted, and stated that it was an "absolute limitation upon 
the power of the state to dispose of such lands, or permit 
them to be disposed of, except for the purposes for which they 
were granted by Congress." We reaffirm what was there 
stated, for we find no reason to change our opinion. If there 
ever was a solemn declaration of trust made by a grantee of 
lands and published as such to all the world, it seems to us 
that this declaration is a perfect example. In view of the 
pledges, guaranties, assurances, and declarations of the Con-
stitution, it must be conceded that these lands are held by 
the state in its governmental capacity and not otherwise. 
Where such is the case, ordinary statutes of limitations do not 
apply. To bring such lands within the operation of limita-
tion statutes, it is extremely doubtful if anything short of an 
amendment to the Constitution could effect the result. It is 
not necessary, however, to determine that question in the in-
stant case. 
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With this_ explanation there ought not longer to be any 
doubt as to the grounds upon which we based our opinion. 
Believing, as we did, that by the Enabling Act the state was 
morally bound because of the "sacred obligation imposed 
upon its public faith," and believing also that by the provi-
sions of the state Consitution it was not only morally but le-
gally bound to see that these lands or the proceeds thereof 
were devoted to school purposes, the court was of opinion the 
statutes of limitatioVi had no application to the case. 
* On the question of damages the writer of the opinion, at 
the time it was written, believed there was substantial evi-
dence to the effect that water for the land could be rented for 
the irrigation season for the sum of $5 per acre. So believ-
ing, by a simple mathematical demonstration he arrived at 
the conclusion that the findings of the court as to plaintiff's 
damages were sustained by the evidence. The opinion was 
accordingly prepared and rendered. When counsel for ap-
pellants filed their petition for a rehearing, and called our 
attention specifically to the evidence upon that point, we 
found it necessary to make a careful investigation, and we 
arc not entirely satisfied that the evidence referred to jus-
tified the conclusion reached in our opinion. While there is 
evidence to the effect that the rental value of water for irriga-
tkm^t^kmnyside^was $5^per^acre for the irrigation season^ 
there is no substantial evidence that such water was avail-
able for the land in question, so that the opinion, in that re-
spect, is subject to the criticism of appellants' counsel. 
This, however, is an action at law. The purpose of the ap-
peal is to reverse the judgment. If there is any substantial 
evidence to sustain the findings the judgment should be af-
firmed. There is evidence in the record of an entirely 
different character from that above referred to, which 8 
it becomes our duty to consider. One Geo. N. Hill, a 
witness for plaintiff, farmer by occupation, acquainted with 
the land in controversy and climatic conditions in that vicin-
ity, testified that during the years 1912 to 1916, inclusive, the 
winter snows and rainfall in the neighborhood where the 
lands arc situated were sufficient to produce one good crop 
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of luccrn without irrigation ; that a good crop of lucern would 
amount to approximately two tons per acre, that baled lucern 
hay during the years mentioned had a market value at Sun-
nyside of $15 to $17 per ton, and that the cost of cutting, 
raking, stacking, wiring, and baling would not exceed $5 per 
ton. Conceding, as contended by appellants' counsel, that 
there were only 38 and a fraction acres of the land in con-
troversy that was in actual cultivation, and, taking the lowest 
market price per ton mentioned in the evidence referred to, 
the amount of damages is easily ascertained. Two tons per 
acre for 38 acres is 76 tons per year. This amount, multi-
plied by $10, the net price per ton after all costs and expenses 
are paid, amounts to $760 per j'ear. For five years, from 
1912 to 1916, inclusive, the amount would be five times $760, 
or $3,800. In addition to this, the same witness testified that 
after the hay was cut the land was worth $1 per acre an-
nually for pasture, which for the five years would aggregate 
$190, making a total of $3,990. 
This court cannot take judicial notice of the fact, or as-
sume as a matter of common knowledge, that the land would 
not produce two tons of lucern per acre, without irrigation, 
or that its market value when baled would not be $15 
per ton, or that the cost of harvesting, baling, and pre- 9 
paring it for market would exceed $5 per ton. If we 
cannot take judicial notice of These facts we are bound to 
accept the evidence as substantial, even though there may be 
those who seriously doubt its credibility. 
Having considered all the grounds assigned by appellants' 
counsel in support of their application for a rehearing the 
court is of the opinion the application should be denied. 
CORFMAN, C. J , and WEBER, GIDEON, and FRICK, 
JJ . , concur. 
